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COMMENT
IN DEFENSE OF UNITED STATES v. BRYAN: WHY THE
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY IS INDEFENSIBLE
Timothy J. Horman*
INTRODUCTION
In September 1993, a jury convicted Elton Bryan, former director of
the West Virginia Lottery, on various counts of mail, wire, and securi-
ties fraud and the court sentenced him to fifty-one months in prison.1
Bryan, while serving as director of the West Virginia Lottery, fraudu-
lently manipulated the awarding of two contracts and, with access to
confidential information regarding these contracts, purchased the se-
curities of a company that had received one of the contracts. 2 In
charging Bryan with securities fraud under section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 19343 ("section 10(b)") and Rule 10b-54 promul-
gated thereunder, the government relied upon the "misappropriation
theory" of insider trading liability. 5 This theory imposes liability on
one "who '(1) misappropriates material nonpublic information (2) by
breaching a duty arising out of a relationship of trust and confidence
and (3) uses that information in a securities transaction, (4) regardless
* The author would like to thank Jon Biondo for his enduring patience and
support.
1. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1995).
2. Id. at 937-39.
3. Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") provides
in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secur-
ity... not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
4. Pursuant to its authority under section 10(b), the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") promulgated Rule 10b-5 which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
5. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 943.
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of whether he owed any duties to the shareholders of the traded
stock.' ",6 The Fourth Circuit, however, refused to uphold Bryan's
conviction under the misappropriation theory.' The court did not
base its decision on Bryan's failure to satisfy the elements of the the-
ory,8 but instead reasoned that behavior resulting in liability under the
theory "does not constitute fraud in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities, within the meaning of section 10(b)." 9 In reaching
this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit examined the language and pur-
pose of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, as well as Supreme Court cases
interpreting these provisions. 10
The Bryan decision is significant because the court refused to en-
dorse a theory adopted by at least three other circuits.1' The Supreme
Court, which has never addressed the issue,' 2 will now have to deter-
mine the validity of the misappropriation theory to restore consistency
to the circuit courts' analysis of insider trading.
In response to Bryan, the Harvard Law Review published a Case
Comment in its December 1995 issue 13 ("Harvard Comment") that
criticized the Bryan decision and concluded that the Fourth Circuit
"ultimately erred" in its conclusion.' 4 The Harvard Comment posits
that contrary to the Bryan court's reading of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), the Supreme Court is not bound by
the statutory text of the Exchange Act or applicable precedent if and
when it examines the validity of the misappropriation theory.'5
This Comment analyzes the Bryan decision and the Harvard Com-
ment. Part I traces the common law development of insider trading
liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, including the evolution of
the misappropriation theory. This part focuses in particular on the
genesis and development of the misappropriation theory in the Sec-
6. Id. at 944 (quoting SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990)).
7. Id.
8. In fact, the Bryan court stated that "Bryan's conduct clearly constituted crimi-
nal activity under this theory of misappropriation." Id. at 945.
9. Id. at 952 (citation omitted).
10. Id. at 944.
11. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071
(1992); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d
12 (2d Cir. 1981). Whether the Third Circuit has adopted the misappropriation theory
is open to debate. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 943 n.5 (4th Cir. 1995)
(citing Rothberg v. Rosenbloon, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985), rev'd after remand, 808
F.2d 252 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017 (1987)).
12. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987) (affirming without opin-
ion Carpenter's conviction based on misappropriation theory in an evenly divided
Court); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235-36 (1980) (refusing to address
government's argument based on misappropriation theory because issue was not
properly charged to the jury).
13. See Recent Case, Securities Law-Insider Trading-Fourth Circuit Rejects Mis-
appropriation Theory of Rule 10b-5 Fraud Liability, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 524, 536 (1995)
[hereinafter Recent Case].
14. Id.
15. Id. at 538, 541.
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ond Circuit. Part II examines in depth the Bryan decision and the
rationale behind the Fourth Circuit's conclusion in that case. Part IIl
analyzes the Harvard Comment and its arguments. In part IV, this
Comment articulates why the misappropriation theory cannot find
support in section 10(b), the legislative history of section 10(b), or
Supreme Court precedent. Part IV also argues that the Second Cir-
cuit has been inconsistent in its application of the misappropriation
theory, and that other alternatives exist to prevent misappropriation
of material inside information. Finally, this Comment concludes that
neither the language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, nor Supreme
Court precedent offer support for the misappropriation theory, and
thus the Court should follow the Fourth Circuit's lead and invalidate
the misappropriation theory as a basis for liability under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5.
I. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SECTION 10(b) LIABILITY
Advocates of the misappropriation theory claim to find support for
the theory under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5.
This part begins with an examination of these statutory provisions and
their respective legislative histories. In addition, this part traces the
development of insider trading liability under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 in early SEC administrative proceedings and in Supreme Court
cases that address insider trading liability and general section 10(b)
liability. Finally, this part examines the origin and development of the
misappropriation theory in the Second, Ninth, and Seventh Circuits,
prior to the Bryan decision.
A. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") and
the Exchange Act in response to the abuses that caused the stock mar-
ket crash of 1929.16 The Securities Act governs the initial distribution
of securities, while the Exchange Act regulates the subsequent trading
of issued securities.17 Insider trading was one of the major abuses that
Congress perceived as a cause of the 1929 crash.18 Congress believed
that fraudulent activities served no "useful economic function" and
caused "great detriment to the investing public."19 Prior to the crash,
various state laws prohibited fraudulent concealment; Congress none-
theless believed that the problem of insider trading required a na-
16. C. Edward Fletcher, Materials on the Law of Insider Trading 45 (1991).
17. Id.; Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 36 (2d ed. 1988).
18. Insider trading has been defined as "the purchase or sale of securities on the
basis of material, non-public information." Fletcher, supra note 16, at 3. The Ex-
change Act does not contain a definition of insider trading. See 15 U.S.C. § 78a-11
(1994).
19. S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
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tional solution.2" Congress' concern with the dangers of insider
trading when it enacted the Exchange Act demonstrates that the stat-
ute was, in part, an attempt to combat this abuse.2'
While the legislative history and text of the Exchange Act indicate
that Congress initially intended section 161 to combat insider trad-
ing,23 section 10(b) subsequently became the most frequently used ba-
sis for establishing insider trading liability.24 Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act makes it unlawful for anyone "[t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security... any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe." 5 Pursuant to the
authority granted by section 10(b), the SEC established Rule 10b-5,
which forbids anyone "[t]o engage in any act ... which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security. '26
20. Fletcher, supra note 16, at 45 (noting that "many of the problems in the securi-
ties markets that were until [the crash] matters of state regulation were thought to be
national problems requiring a national solution"). The need for national solutions
arose from a belief that state blue sky laws varied widely from state to state and were
therefore ineffective. See Michael E. Parrish, Securities Regulation and The New Deal
28-30 (1970). Further, it has been stated that prior to the enactment of federal securi-
ties laws, "insider trading was generally treated as an acceptable perquisite granted to
corporate insiders." Nasser Arshadi & Thomas H. Eyssell, The Law and Finance of
Corporate Insider Trading: Theory and Evidence 43 (1993).
21. See Fletcher, supra note 16, at 45 ("[W]ith the 1934 Act came an attempt by
Congress to rid the markets of insider trading."); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 (1975) (describing the Exchange Act as "an Act 'to
provide for the regulation of securities.., to prevent inequitable and unfair practices
... and for other purposes' " (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78a-1/)); Loss, supra note 17, at 36
(stating that the Exchange Act had as a theme the "prevention of fraud and market
manipulation").
22. Section 16 of the Exchange Act: (1) requires that insiders, including directors
and officers, of a company required to register under the Exchange Act file state-
ments with the SEC describing any changes in their holdings in the company's stock;
(2) makes short-swing profits recoverable by the firm; and (3) prohibits short selling
by insiders of their own firms' shares. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1994).
23. Fletcher, supra note 16, at 45; see also H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
13 (1934) (stating that section 16 provides for "full and prompt publicity" to prevent
abuse of insider information).
24. Fletcher, supra note 16, at 99 (noting that "the original statutory provision
designed to deal with insider trading-section 16 of the 1934 Act- was (and is) use-
less in most cases because it is so underinclusive"); see also Arshadi & Eyssell, supra
note 20, at 45 (stating that "limitations have made Section 16(b) a less than effective
tool against insider trading"). Section 16 is limited in effectiveness because it is un-
derinclusive in that it does not prohibit all forms of insider trading and overinclusive
in that the "insiders" caught by the section include persons who are not trading on the
basis of any inside information. See Fletcher, supra note 16, at 45-46.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (1995). Twenty-five years after the promulgation of
Rule lOb-5, Milton Freeman, one of its original drafters,-remarked that the Rule was a
combination of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and section 17 of the Securities Act
created in response to a question concerning what the Commission could do about the
president of a company who was purchasing the company's stock while saying pub-
2458 [Vol. 64
UNITED STATES V. BRYAN
B. Rule 10(b) Liability
The SEC is responsible for enforcement of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 violations and may bring an administrative proceeding against
violators or an injunctive proceeding in federal court.27 This section
reviews early attempts by the SEC to establish insider trading liability
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. This section then looks to the
development of liability under section 10(b) in the Supreme Court
both generally and specifically for insider traders.
1. Early Insider Trading Cases
In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co. ,2 the SEC charged
Cady, Roberts & Co., a broker-dealer,2 9 and Robert Gintel, a selling
broker and partner of Cady, Roberts, with violations of section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5.30 In November 1959, J. Cheever Cowdin, a registered
representative3' associated with Cady, Roberts, attended a quarterly
meeting of the directors of Curtiss-Wright2 At the meeting, the di-
rectors decided to cut the upcoming quarterly dividend by almost fifty
percent per share compared with dividends the company paid in the
previous three quarters.3 3 The board then approved prompt disclo-
sure of the dividend reduction.3 Immediately upon leaving the direc-
tors meeting, Cowdin called the Cady, Roberts offices and left a
message for Gintel that Curtiss-Wright had cut its quarterly divi-
dend.3 5 After receiving the message, Gintel placed sell orders for
7000 shares of Curtiss-Wright stock.36 Due to various delays, the pub-
lic announcement concerning the dividend reduction did not appear
licly that the company was performing poorly. See Conference on Codification of the
Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 793, 921-23 (1967). In the meeting to adopt
Rule 10b-5 "[a]ll the commissioners read the rule and... tossed it on the table,
indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike who said, 'Well,' he
said, 'we are against fraud, aren't we?'" Id at 922.
27. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. CL 1439, 1445 (1994).
28. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
29. A "broker" is defined in the Exchange Act as "any person engaged in the
business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(4) (1994). A "dealer" is defined in the Exchange Act as "any person en-
gaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(5) (1994). "The term 'registered broker or dealer' means a broker or dealer
registered or required to register [under the Exchange Act]." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(48)
(1994).
30. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 908.
31. A "registered representative" is a person who is associated with a National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. member firm. Pass Trak Series 7 Principles &
Practices: General Securities Representative 291 (6th ed. 1991) [hereinafter Pass
Trak].
32. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 909.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id
36. Id
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on the Dow Jones News Ticker Service and did not reach the New
York Stock Exchange until after Gintel had placed his sell orders.37
The SEC found in an administrative proceeding that the actions of
Gintel and Cady, Roberts violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.38 In
so holding, the SEC stated that the prohibitions imposed by section
10(b) of the Exchange Act
rest[ ] on two principal elements; first, the existence of a relation-
ship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to
be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal
benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved
where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.39
Gintel had indirect access to the information concerning the reduction
in Curtiss-Wright's dividend because of his relationship with Cowdin,
who was an insider by virtue of his position as a director of Curtiss-
Wright.4" In addition, the information Gintel possessed was "clearly
recognizable as having a direct effect on the market value of securities
and the judgment of investors."'" Because Gintel had engaged in a
"purchase or sale of securities" using information not available to the
general public, the SEC found that he violated section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.42
The SEC's decision in Cady, Roberts established for the first time
liability under Rule 10b-5 for individuals not classified as traditional
insiders. The SEC used an "equal access to information" theory as
the basis for such liability.43 Under the traditional doctrine of Rule
10b-5 liability, " 'insiders,' (particularly officers, directors, or control-
ling stockholders)" have an affirmative duty to "disclose material facts
which are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not
known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would
affect their investment judgment."'  Gintel was not a traditional in-
sider under these terms.45 His partner, Cowdin, however, was, and
37. Id. The Secretary of Curtiss-Wright had attempted to deliver the announce-
ment to the New York Stock Exchange by Western Union, but through some un-
known mistake, Western Union did not deliver the telegram until almost an hour and
a half after it was transmitted. Id.
38. Id. at 911.
39. Id. at 912 (footnote omitted).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 915.
42. Id. at 911. Because Gintel was a partner at Cady, Roberts, the court found the
firm liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See id. ("We also find a similar
violation by [Cady, Roberts], since the actions of Gintel, a member of registrant, in
the course of his employment are to be regarded as actions of [Cady, Roberts]
itself.").
43. See id. at 912.
44. Id at 911 (citing Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.2d 808, 828-29 (D. Del.
1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947); In re
Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373, 380-81 (1943)).
45. Id. at 912.
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the SEC found that this relationship imposed a duty on both Gintel
and Cady, Roberts to abstain from trading the stock before public dis-
closure of the information.46
The Second Circuit also explored the boundaries of liability under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.47 The
SEC charged Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., as well as thirteen individuals,
with violating section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.8 Texas Gulf owned land
in Canada that contained significant mineral deposits.49 Before the
presence of minerals was announced to the public, corporate officers
and directors bought large numbers of shares in the company.5 " Sub-
sequent to the mineral discovery announcement, the price of Texas
Gulf stock increased by at least 100%.51 The directors and officers
then sold their holdings at a substantial profit.Y2
The Second Circuit found that the officers' and directors' actions
violated Rule 10b-5.53 Citing Cady, Roberts, the Texas Gulf Sulphur
court stated:
The essence of the Rule is that anyone who, trading for his own
account in the securities of a corporation has "access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corpo-
rate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone" may not
take "advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to
those with whom he is dealing," i.e., the investing public.5
Like the SEC in Cady, Roberts, the Second Circuit suggested that in-
sider trading liability under Rule 10b-5 could be imposed on defend-
ants who are not traditional insiders. 55 The court held that anyone
possessing "material inside information" who failed to disclose such
information to the investing public before trading or, if unable to dis-
close the information, failed to abstain from trading altogether, was
subject to liability under Rule 10b-5.56 In reaching this conclusion, the
Second Circuit looked to the congressional intent underlying section
10(b) and stated:
The core of Rule 10b-5 is the implementation of the [c]ongressional
purpose that all investors should have equal access to the rewards of
participation in securities transactions. It was the intent of Congress
46. Id. at 912, 914.
47. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cerL denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
48. It. at 839-41.
49. Id. at 843-44.
50. ad at 846-47.
51. Id. at 847.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 863.
54. Id. at 848 (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C 907, 912 (1961)).
55. Rule 10b-5 is, of course, still applicable to traditional insiders. As the Texas
Gulf court explicitly stated, "[T]he Rule is also applicable to one possessing the infor-
mation who may not be strictly termed an 'insider' within the meaning of Sec. 16(b) of
the Act." Id at 848.
56. Id.
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that all members of the investing public should be subject to identi-
cal market risks .... Such inequities based upon unequal access to
knowledge should not be shrugged off as inevitable in our way of
life, or, in view of the congressional concern in the area, remain
uncorrected. 7
Thus, the Second Circuit adopted what became known as the "equal
access" theory for interpreting section 10(b).
2. Supreme Court Treatment of Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and
Insider Trading
The Supreme Court over the past thirty years has addressed insider
trading liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, as well as other
fraudulent activities which give rise to liability under these provisions.
This section first highlights some important decisions that address
fraudulent activities covered by section 10(b), other than insider trad-
ing, and that provide insight into the Court's interpretation of section
10(b). Additionally, this section examines closely the two instances to
date in which the Supreme Court specifically addressed insider trading
liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
a. Other Fraudulent Activities under Section 10(b)
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,58 the Supreme Court
touched on the issue of whether a private plaintiff had to be a "pur-
chaser"59 or "seller" 60 of securities as defined by the Exchange Act in
order to recover in a Rule 10b-5 cause of action.6' In finding that a
plaintiff must occupy one of these roles,62 the Court considered,
among other things, the textual scheme of the Securities and Ex-
change Acts. The Court compared the text of section 10(b), which
creates liability for fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale,"
with section 17(a) of the Securities Act, which creates liability for
fraud "in the offer or sale."'63 The Court concluded that if Congress
had wished to provide a remedy under section 10(b) for plaintiffs who
had neither purchased nor sold securities, it knew how to do so, as
evidenced by section 17(a).64 The Court thereby laid the foundation
for its eventual conclusion that only fraud that takes place in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of securities falls within the scope of
section 10(b).
57. Id. at 851-52.
58. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
59. "Purchase" is defined in the Exchange Act as "any contract to buy, purchase,
or otherwise acquire." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1994).
60. "Sell" is defined in the Exchange Act as "any contract to sell or otherwise
dispose of." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1994).
61. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 725.
62. Id. at 754-55.
63. Id. at 733-34 (comparing 15 U.S.C. § 77q with 15 U.S.C. § 78j).
64. Id.
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The Supreme Court considered the intent necessary for a Rule 10b-
5 cause of action in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.6 The Court held
that absent an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, a private
cause of action for damages will not lie under Rule 10b-5.1 Ernst &
Ernst is significant because the Court examined for the first time the
legislative history of section 10(b). In so doing, the Court determined
that the section was a "catchall" provision intended by Congress "'to
deal with new manipulative [or cunning] devices.' "67 The Court de-
scribed the congressional objective underlying section 10(b) as the
prevention of" 'manipulative and deceptive practices which... fulfill
no useful function' and [the creation] of private actions for damages
stemming from 'illicit practices,' where the defendant has not acted in
good faith."'
The Court in Santa Fe Industries v. Green6 9 again examined the
scope of section 10(b) liability and addressed specifically what consti-
tutes fraud under Rule 10b-5.10 The Court began by reinforcing that
"the starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is
'the language itself.' "v' Finding that "[t]he language of § 10(b) gives
no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involv-
ing manipulation or deception,"' the Court concluded that a section
10(b) or Rule 10b-5 claim can lie only for "manipulative or deceptive"
conduct within the meaning of the statute.' According to the Court
in Santa Fe, merely reckless statements will not subject a defendant to
section 10(b) liability.
Thus, the Court then focused on whether the defendant's actions
were either deceptive or manipulative. The Court determined that the
defendant's conduct was not deceptive because it did not involve "de-
ception, misrepresentation or nondisclosure." 74 In evaluating what
constitutes manipulation, the Court stated that manipulation is " 'vir-
tually a term of art when used in connection with securities markets'
... [and] refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched
orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by arti-
65. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
66. Id at 193.
67. Id at 203 (quoting Thomas G. Corcoran, spokesman for the Rule's drafters)
(alteration in original).
68. Id. at 206 (quoting S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 12-13 (1934)).
69. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
70. Id. at 471.
71. Id at 472 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976)
(quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell,
J., concurring))).
72. Id. at 473.
73. Id at 473-74.
74. Id at 476.
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ficially affecting market activity."75 The Court concluded that the de-
fendant's conduct did not fall within this category, and stated:
Congress meant to prohibit the full range of ingenious devices that
might be used to manipulate securities prices. But we do not think
it would have chosen this "term of art" if it had meant to bring
within the scope of § 10(b) instances of corporate mismanagement
such as [here, where] the essence of the complaint is that sharehold-
ers were treated unfairly by a fiduciary.76
The Court addressed additional considerations,77 but found that the
text of section 10(b) was "'sufficiently clear in its context' to be dis-
positive. ' 78 The Court in Santa Fe thus established the parameters of
the "manipulative and deceptive" requirement of section 10(b).
In its most recent encounter with section 10(b), the Court in Central
Bank v. First Interstate Bank79 addressed "whether private civil liabil-
ity under § 10(b) extends ... to those who do not engage in the ma-
nipulative or deceptive practice but who aid and abet the violation." 80
The Court concluded that the statute does not encompass aiding and
abetting liability for private plaintiffs, and that "[i]t is inconsistent
with settled methodology in § 10(b) cases to extend liability beyond
the scope of conduct prohibited by the statutory text. ' 81 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court relied on its earlier cases which consistently
hold that section 10(b) violations must be premised upon "the making
of a material misstatement (or omission) or the commission of a ma-
nipulative act."8" The Court in Central Bank thus reaffirmed its ear-
lier commitment to the "manipulative or deceptive" parameters and
the "in connection with" requirement of section 10(b) established by
the Court in Blue Chip and Santa Fe.
75. Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)). Match
sales are a group of transactions arranged by an individual who sends numerous or-
ders, some to buy and others to sell, simultaneously to different brokers who, without
knowledge that simultaneous orders have been placed, execute the orders, thereby
causing a superficial appearance of market activity. See Charles A. Dice, The Stock
Market 423 (1926). Wash sales, by comparison, are transactions in which no change in
ownership takes place, but where the buyer and seller agree to "exchange" the stock
at an above market price, thus creating activity in the stock and making it appear
more healthy. See id. at 421-22.
76. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 477.
77. Specifically, the Court considered the purpose of the Exchange Act and corre-
sponding state law remedies. See id at 477-79.
78. Id. at 477 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976)).
79. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
80. Id. at 1443.
81. Id. at 1448.
82. Id.
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b. Insider Trading Liability under Section 10(b)
The Supreme Court first examined insider trading liability under
Rule 10b-5 in Chiarella v. United States. 3 Chiarella concerned
"whether a person who learns from the confidential documents of one
corporation that it is planning an attempt to secure control of a second
corporation violates § 10(b) ... if he fails to disclose the impending
takeover before trading in the target company's securities."84 Vincent
Chiarella, the defendant in the case, worked in the composing room of
Pandick Press, a financial printer, and thus had access to corporate
takeover bid documents from which he was able to ascertain the iden-
tities of target companies.85 Chiarella purchased stock in the target
companies, without disclosing his knowledge of the potential take-
overs, and then sold the stock at a substantial profit after the takeover
attempts were publicized.86 Chiarella was subsequently indicted for
violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and convicted on all
counts The Second Circuit affirmed these convictions.'
The Supreme Court, however, reversed Chiarella's convictions
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.89 Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, found that "one who fails to disclose material information
prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when
he is under a duty to do so."' 9 Such duty arises, according to the
Court, "when one party has information 'that the other [party] is enti-
tled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust
and confidence between'" the two parties. 91 The Court reasoned that
the application of a duty to disclose in these circumstances "guaran-
tees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the
shareholder's welfare before their own, will not benefit personally
through fraudulent use of material, nonpublic information."'
The Court in Chiarella stated that the trial court and the Second
Circuit failed to identify a relationship between Chiarella and the
83. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
84. Ik at 224.
85. l Target companies are companies subject to potential merger or acquisition
by another company. In Chiarella, the identity of the target companies were con-
cealed by the use of blank spaces or false names in the places where the true names
would be inserted on the night of the final printing. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 225.
88. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1373 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S.
222 (1980).
89. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 225.
90. Id. at 228.
91. Id (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(a) (1976)) (alteration in
original). Such relationships can include, among others: principal and agent, execu-
tor and beneficiary, banks and depositor, attorney and client, and partners. See Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(a) cmt. f (1976).
92. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
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stock sellers that gave rise to a duty to disclose on Chiarella's part.93
Chiarella was not an insider, nor had he received confidential infor-
mation from the target companies. The Court reasoned that in order
to find Chiarella liable under Rule 10b-5, it would have to
"recogniz[e] a general duty between all participants in market transac-
tions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information."94 In
declining to recognize such a duty, the Court concluded:
We see no basis for applying such a new and different theory of
liability in this case. As we have emphasized before, the 1934 Act
cannot be read "'more broadly than its language and the statutory
scheme reasonably permit.' " Section 10(b) is aptly described as a
catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud. When an alle-
gation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud
absent a duty to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under
§ 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic mar-
ket information. The contrary result is without support in the legis-
lative history of § 10(b) and would be inconsistent with the careful
plan that Congress has enacted for regulation of the securities
markets.95
The Chiarella court thereby rejected the "equal access" theory
adopted in Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf.
Finally, the majority refused to address the government's "misap-
propriation theory" because the theory was not submitted to the
jury.96 The government had argued on appeal that Chiarella's breach
of duty occurred when he traded based on information obtained by
virtue of his position at the printer employed by the corporation.97
The government contended that the misappropriation theory is valid
because it is based on fraud committed against the corporation and
the stock sellers.98 The Court concluded, however, that because the
jury had not received instructions regarding a duty to anyone other
than the sellers, the Court could not speculate as to the existence of
any other duty.99
The Court again addressed liability for insider trading under section
10(b) in Dirks v. SEC. 100 Raymond Dirks was an officer of a New
York broker-dealer that specialized in the analysis of insurance com-
pany securities. 1 1 Dirks received information from a former officer
of Equity Funding of America, an insurance and mutual fund com-
93. Id. at 231-32.
94. Id at 233.
95. Id at 234-35 (citations omitted).
96. Id at 236. For a complete discussion of the dissenting opinions in the case
concerning the misappropriation theory, see infra notes 118-32 and accompanying
text.
97. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235-36.
98. Id
99. Id at 236-37.
100. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
101. Id. at 648.
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pany, that Equity Funding's assets were grossly overstated due to
fraudulent practices. 1 2 The former officer urged Dirks to disclose the
fraud publicly.'0 3 Dirks did investigate the allegations, which later
proved to be true, and throughout his investigation openly discussed
the information he obtained with a number of clients.1  These clients
subsequently sold their shares of Equity Funding stock.10 5
The SEC charged Dirks in an administrative proceeding with aiding
and abetting a fraud in violation of section 17(a) of the Securities Act,
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5, for which he was
found guilty.106 In finding that Dirk's discussions concerning Equity
Funding violated these provisions, the SEC concluded: "''Where 'tip-
pees'-regardless of their motivation or occupation-come into pos-
session of material 'corporate information that they know is
confidential and know or should know came from a corporate insider,'
they must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from
trading.' "107 The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the SEC's
decision.' 08
The Supreme Court, however, reversed Dirk's convictions. 3 9 The
Court, citing Cady, Roberts and Chiarella, began with the premise that
an insider is liable for a failure to disclose material nonpublic informa-
tion only when he has a duty to disclose such information, and that
this duty arises only through an agency, fiduciary, or "trust and confi-
dence" relationship.' 0 The Court rejected the concept that "all trad-
102. Id. at 649.
103. Id
104. ht
105. 11. Included in those who sold based upon Dirks' information were numerous
investment advisors who liquidated at least $16 million in Equity Funding stock. I&a
106. SEC v. Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Dock. 1401 (1981), aff'd, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir.
1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
107. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 651 (1983) (quoting Dirks. 21 S.E.C. Dock. 1401,
1407 (1981) (footnote omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,230
n.12 (1980))). Tippees are persons who receive material inside information from a
traditional insider, but have no fiduciary relationship with the corporation or its
shareholders. See id. at 655.
108. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
109. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 652.
110. Id at 654. Corporate officers and directors "have a fiduciary duty to promote
the interests of the corporation," and not "play favorites among the shareholders." 1
William E. Knepper & Dan A. Bailey, Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors
§ 1-7, at 15, § 1-14, at 34 (5th ed. 1993); see also Gottlieb v. McKee, 107 A.2d 240,243
(Del. Ch. 1954) (recognizing corporate officers' and directors' fiduciary duties to
shareholders under Delaware corporations law); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 717(a) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1996) ("A director shall perform his duties as a director... in good
faith and with that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person in a like posi-
tion would use under similar circumstances."). The Supreme Court did recognize,
however, that under certain circumstances outsiders may become fiduciaries of the
shareholders. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14 ("For such a duty to be imposed ... the
corporation must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information
confidential, and the relationship at least must imply such a duty.").
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ers must enjoy equal information before trading,""' but found that
tippees are not always free to trade on the basis of inside informa-
tion.112 According to the Court, tippees can assume an insider's duty
to shareholders if the inside information is made available to them
improperly.113 Information is received "improperly" if conveyed by
an insider in violation of that insider's fiduciary duty to the sharehold-
ers, and if the tippee knows or should know that a breach has oc-
curred." 4 Thus, a duty under Rule 10b-5 on the part of a tippee
results if an insider "has breached his fiduciary duty to the sharehold-
ers by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows
or should know that there has been a breach.""' 5 In Dirks, the former
director of Equity Funding did not violate any duty by disclosing the
information concerning the alleged fraud; thus, Dirks could not have
derivatively breached a duty. 16
The decisions in Chiarella and Dirks demonstrate that the Court
will not find liability for insider trading under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 absent a duty owed to the counterparty to the securities transac-
tion at issue. The Court does not, however, limit liability to tradi-
tional insiders; outsiders who owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders and
tippees who know or should know that their source has breached a
fiduciary duty can be liable for trading on the basis of nonpublic infor-
mation. Other outsiders, however, are not subject to liability.
C. Development of the Misappropriation Theory
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent in Chiarella v. United States,"7
laid the groundwork for what was to become the misappropriation
theory. This section first discusses the Chief Justice's opinion in
Chiarella. This section then traces the adoption and development of
the misappropriation theory in the Second Circuit. Finally, this sec-
tion examines the development of the misappropriation theory in the
Ninth and Seventh Circuits.
1. Chief Justice Burger's Dissent in Chiarella
The Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella marks the first time the
misappropriation theory of insider trading received attention from the
High Court. The Chiarella majority refused to address an argument
that the government raised only on appeal-that Chiarella was liable
111. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657.
112. Id. at 659.
113. Id. at 660.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 666-67.
117. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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under the misappropriation theory-because the jury was not in-
structed as to this argument.""
Chief Justice Burger disagreed, stating in a dissenting opinion that
the jury had received instructions on the misappropriation theory, and
that he would have affirmed Chiarefla's conviction on such grounds. 119
Chief Justice Burger noted that he "would read § 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 to encompass and build on this principle: ... that a person who has
misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to dis-
close that information or to refrain from trading."12 The Chief Jus-
tice reasoned that the language of both section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
the history of the statute and the Rule, and the cases interpreting
these provisions supported his conclusion.'
First, according to the Chief Justice, the broad language contained
in section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 supports the conclusion that an indi-
vidual who misappropriates nonpublic information has an absolute
duty to disclose or refrain from trading on that information." The
Chief Justice argued: "The very language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
'by repeated use of the word "any" [was] obviously meant to be
inclusive.' "123
Chief Justice Burger also noted that the history underlying section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 supports the misappropriation theory because
these antifraud provisions were intended to ensure fairness among in-
vestors12A and to prohibit practices that serve no useful function.125
Chief Justice Burger reasoned that, contrary to the "fairness" sought
by Congress in enacting section 10(b), the misappropriator who
purchases securities on the basis of material nonpublic information
gains an unfair trading advantage.12 As to Congress' desire to pro-
hibit nonuseful practices, the Chief Justice noted that a misap-
propriator's trading serves no function other than to enrich the
misappropriator.127
118. Id at 236-37.
119. Id. at 239 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Mar-
shall agreed with the Chief Justice's approval of the misappropriation theory. See id
at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[A] person violates § 10(b) whenever he improp-
erly obtains or converts to his own benefit nonpublic information which he then uses
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities."); id. at 251 (Blackmun J. and
Marshall J., dissenting) ("I would hold that persons having access to confidential ma-
terial information that is not legally available to others generally are prohibited by
Rule 10b-5 from engaging in schemes to exploit their structural informational advan-
tage through trading in affected securities.").
120. Id. at 240 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
121. Id. at 240-42.
122. d. at 240-41.
123. Id at 241 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151
(1972)).
124. Id. (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1975)).
125. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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In addition, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the misappropria-
tion theory "follows naturally" from the Cady, Roberts decision." 8
The Chief Justice recalled the two factors set forth in Cady, Roberts,
namely" 'access... to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose' ... [and] the unfairness inherent in trading on such
information."'2 9 Chief Justice Burger concluded that both Cady, Rob-
erts factors are met whenever a party gains an informational advan-
tage by unlawful means, and thus the misappropriation theory satisfies
both factors. 130
Finally, Chief Justice Burger noted that the misappropriation theory
would not threaten "legitimate business practices" such as "warehous-
ing" or analysis by market specialists.13 ' The Chief Justice reasoned
that such legitimate practices would not violate the misappropriation
theory because while such practices involve trading on the basis of
material nonpublic information, the information at issue is not unlaw-
fully misappropriated for personal gain. 132
2. Adoption and Development of the Misappropriation Theory in
the Second Circuit
In United States v. Newman, 33 the government attempted to rem-
edy the problem that led the Supreme Court to refuse to review the
misappropriation theory in Chiarella. Two of the defendants in New-
man, E. Jacques Courtois, Jr. and Adrian Antoniu, were employees of
investment banking firms.'3 Between January 1973 and December
1978, Courtois and Antoniu stole confidential merger and acquisition
information from their employers and conveyed the information to
James Newman, a securities trader and manager at a brokerage
firm.' 35 Newman in turn passed on the information to two confeder-
ates.' 36 Based on the information, Courtois, Antoniu, and Newman
surreptitiously purchased stock in companies that were takeover and
merger targets of clients of Courtois' and Antoniu's firms.' 37 New-
man and his coconspirators reaped substantial gains by selling the
stock after public announcement of the takeovers and mergers. 3 8
The SEC subsequently charged Newman with "'aid[ing], par-
ticipat[ing] in and facilitat[ing] Courtois and Antoniu in violating the
fiduciary duties of honesty, loyalty and silence owed directly to the
128. Id.
129. 1d. (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)).
130. See id. at 241-42.
131. Id. at 242.
132. Id. at 242-43.
133. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
134. Id. at 15.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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[investment firms], and clients of those investment banks.' ",39 The
indictment also charged that Newman committed fraud and deceit in
connection with the purchase of securities on the investment banks,
which, in turn, owed a fiduciary duty to the target companies and their
shareholders. 14
Thus, the Government properly presented the misappropriation
theory at the trial level, enabling the Second Circuit to address the
viability of the theory.' 4' The Second Circuit determined that the
"conduct as alleged in the indictment could be found to constitute a
criminal violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 despite the fact that
neither [the investment firms] nor their clients w[ere] at the time a
purchaser or seller of the target company securities in any transaction
with any of the defendants."' 42 The court determined that Newman's
actions constituted a violation of Rule 10b-5 because they were fraud-
ulent, deceitful, and undertaken in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities. 14 3
The Second Circuit first noted that Rule 10b-5 makes "it unlawful
for any person to engage in any act or practice which operates as a
fraud or deceit upon any person 'in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.' "'4 The court then considered the requirement
of "fraud and deceit" and concluded that it "need spend little time on
the issue."'145 Citing Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella, the
Newman court concluded that by misappropriating valuable nonpublic
information which was confidentially entrusted to him, Newman de-
frauded the investment banks just "as surely as if [he] took their
money."'146 The court then turned to the "in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities" requirement under section 10(b). Rea-
soning that Newman's sole purpose in obtaining the nonpublic infor-
mation was to purchase stock in companies that were the subjects of
the misappropriated information, the court found "little merit" in the
contention that Newman's fraud was not in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities. 147 The Second Circuit therefore af-
firmed Newman's conviction. 148
139. Id. at 16.
140. 1&
141. 1l
142. Id. (footnote omitted).
143. See id. at 16-19.
144. Id. at 16-17.
145. Id. at 17.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 18. The Newman court cited Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers
Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971), in which the Supreme Court construed the
"in connection with" requirement to encompass any activities "touching" the sale of
securities. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981).
148. Newman, 664 F.2d at 16.
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In Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc.,149 the shareholder derivative law-
suit relating to the criminal proceeding in Newman, the Second Circuit
again addressed, but this time declined to accept, the misappropria-
tion theory of liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.15 0 In No-
vember 1976, Warner-Lambert Company retained Morgan Stanley to
advise it on a potential tender offer for Deseret Pharmaceuticals Com-
pany. 151 On November 30, 1976, Courtois informed Antoniu of the
potential tender offer and urged him to purchase stock in Deseret. 5
Later that day, Antoniu informed James Newman of the impending
tender offer and, pursuant to an agreement among the three men,
Newman purchased nearly 12,000 shares of Deseret stock at twenty-
eight dollars per share.'53 Michael Moss was among the individuals
who sold Newman his Deseret stock for twenty-eight dollars per share
on November 30.154 On the following day, trading in Deseret stock
was halted and remained suspended until Warner-Lambert announced
a tender offer for thirty-eight dollars per share. 155 Moss subsequently
sued Newman, alleging, inter alia, violations of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.' 56
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the ac-
tion for failure to state a claim for relief.157 Moss had urged the court
"to include the defendants in th[e] category of nontraditional 'insid-
ers' and argued that they necessarily violated section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 by purchasing Deseret stock without publicly disclosing their
knowledge of the impending tender offer.' 1 58 The court rejected this
contention. 159 In so doing, the court first dismissed the argument that
Newman owed a duty of disclosure to Moss.' 60 The court also re-
jected Moss' assertion that the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella
permitted a cause of action against anyone "who trades on the basis of
nonpublic 'misappropriated' information.'' In this regard, the court
stated:
In effect, plaintiff's "misappropriation" theory would grant him a
windfall recovery simply to discourage tortious conduct by securi-
ties purchasers. Yet, the Supreme Court has made clear that section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 protect investors against fraud; they do not
remedy every instance of undesirable conduct involving securities.
149. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
150. Id. at 16.
151. ld. at 8.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 9.
158. Id. at 11.
159. Id. at 12.
160. Id. at 15.
161. Id.
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As defendants owed no duty of disclosure to plaintiff Moss, they
committed no "fraud" in purchasing shares of Deseret stock.
Moreover, the Court has refused to recognize "a general duty be-
tween all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based
on material, nonpublic information." . . . We find that plaintiff's
'misappropriation' theory clearly contradicts the Supreme Court's
holding in both Chiarella and Dirks and therefore conclude that the
complaint fails to state a valid section 10(b) or rule 10b-5 cause of
action.16
2
The Moss court thereby rejected the interpretive approach to section
10(b) adopted in Newman, choosing instead to rely upon the majority
decision in Chiarella, as well as Dirks, as the basis for its opinion.
In SEC v. Materia,63 the Second Circuit again addressed the valid-
ity of the misappropriation theory and somewhat surprisingly, re-
turned to its original support for the theory. Anthony Materia was an
employee of a printer who specialized in financial documents. 16 Due
to the extremely sensitive nature of many of the documents (i.e.,
tender offer documents), information regarding a company's identity
was ordinarily omitted until immediately prior to the completion of
the proposed deal, and thus an ordinary perusal of the documents
"would not reveal the information sought to be guarded.""a None-
theless, in performing his job as a copyholder, Materia read drafts of
documents aloud to a proofreader, thereby enabling him to discern
the identifies of four or more target companies. 166 Materia subse-
quently purchased stock in the target companies and then sold the
stock for a substantial profit following public announcement of the
takeovers. 67
The SEC filed an enforcement action against Materia, alleging sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations predicated upon "Materia's trad-
ing in securities on the basis of material nonpublic information...
misappropriated from his employer and its clients."'6 In a nonjury
trial, Materia was convicted, enjoined from further trading, and forced
to disgorge almost $100,000 in profits. 69
The Second Circuit affirmed Materia's conviction. 17 0 Citing New-
man, the Second Circuit stated that "[t]he facts in the instant appeal
are sufficiently similar to those in Newman for us to affirm on the
authority of that precedent alone."' 7 ' The court, however, decided to
162. Id. at 16 (citations omitted).
163. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984).
164. Id. at 199.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 199-200.
169. Id. at 200.
170. Id. at 204.
171. Id. at 201.
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elucidate the bases for its holding "[t]o delineate the contours of what
may still be perceived as a novel theory of liability."17
As in Newman, the court in Materia started with the premise that
under section 10(b) it is "'unlawful for any person ... [t]o engage in
any act ... which operates.., as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities.' "173 Also as in
Newman, the court had little trouble finding that misappropriation of
material nonpublic information "falls squarely within" the fraud or
deceit requirement of Rule 10b-5.174
The Second Circuit next addressed Materia's argument that in or-
der to be actionable under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, fraud must
be predicated on a duty to disclose. Here, the court relied on its pre-
vious decision in Chiarella, which held that "liability could be pre-
mised upon [the defendant's] having misappropriated ... information
from his employer and its clients.' 175 Because the Supreme Court did
not explicitly reject the misappropriation theory in Chiarella, the Sec-
ond Circuit felt free to revive the theory.'76 Finally, the court ad-
dressed Materia's contention that his alleged fraud was not in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities.'77 The court re-
jected this argument and stated that the requirement was met by the
"self-evident nexus presented in this case."'1 78 Because it found that
the government had proven all the elements required to establish
Rule 10b-5 liability, the Second Circuit affirmed Materia's
conviction. 79
The Second Circuit next addressed the misappropriation theory in
United States v. Carpenter,8 and applied the theory to a situation
where the trader's employer lacked a fiduciary relationship with the
traded company. David Carpenter, a news clerk for the Wall Street
Journal, worked with R. Foster Winans, who, as a reporter for the
paper, sometimes wrote the Journal's "Heard on the Street" col-
umn. 18 Carpenter and Winans, contrary to the known policies of the
172. Id.
173. Id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984)).
174. Id. The Second Circuit stated, "Materia's theft of information was indeed as
fraudulent as if he had converted corporate funds for his personal benefit." Id. at 201-
02.
175. Id. at 202 (citing United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1364-69 (2d Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)).
176. Id. at 203.
177. Id.
178. Id. The court stated clearly, "The information Materia stole has no value
whatsoever except 'in connection with' his subsequent purchase of securities." Id.
179. Id. at 203-04.
180. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
181. id. at 1026. The "Heard on the Street" column discussed positive and negative
information concerning certain stocks and offered an opinion regarding investment in
such stocks. See United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
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paper, provided Kenneth Fells, a stockbroker, with information about
particular securities prior to the scheduled appearance of such infor-
mation in Winans' column."s Based on this information, Felis,
through various accounts, traded stock in the companies mentioned in
"Heard on the Street."'8 The scheme eventually netted Carpenter,
Winans, and Felis almost $700,000 in profits.' All three individuals
were later charged with violations of section 10(b) and convicted in a
nonjury trial.' 5 Thus, the Second Circuit had to determine on appeal
whether section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 imposes liability on one "who
owe[s] to the corporation and its shareholders [no] fiduciary duty of
abstention or disclosure."'1 6
The Second Circuit held that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could
support such liability.' s The court rejected the defendant's argument
that the requisite breach of duty must relate to the corporations or
shareholders whose stock the misappropriator purchased or sold in
reliance on the misappropriated information and stated that the mis-
appropriation theory "broadly proscribes the conversion by 'insiders'
or others of material nonpublic information in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities."" s The court further posited that sec-
tion 10(b) was "broad in scope, encompassing all 'manipulative and
deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful
function.' "189
The court was also satisfied that Carpenter's actions met the "fraud
and deceit," "upon any person," and "in connection with" require-
ments of Rule 10b-5. 11 In addressing these elements, the court first
determined that Carpenter's activities were not so significantly differ-
ent from those undertaken by the defendants in Newman and Materia,
and thus constituted the requisite "fraud or deceit."191 Next, the court
determined that the fraud committed by Carpenter on the Wall Street
Journal was inflicted "upon any person."'192 Finally, the court deduced
that those "who purchased or sold securities [from the defendants]
without the misappropriated information would not have purchased
182. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026.
183. Id. at 1026-27.
184. Id. at 1027.
185. Winans, 612 F. Supp. at 850.
186. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1028-29.
187. At at 1029-31.
188. Id. at 1029 (citing SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984); United
States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425,
438 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
189. Id. at 1030 (quoting Materia, 745 F.2d at 201 (quoting S. Rep. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934))).
190. See id. at 1031-32.
191. Id The court stated that "such conduct constituted fraud and deceit, as it
would had Wimans stolen material nonpublic information from traditional corporate
insiders or quasi-insiders." Id. at 1032.
192. Id. at 1032.
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or sold.., had they had the benefit of that information," and there-
fore the "in connection with" standard was met.193 The Second Cir-
cuit concluded that the defendants had a duty under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 to abstain from trading or to disclose the misappropriated
information to those with whom they traded.194 Because the defend-
ants failed to do so, the court affirmed their convictions.
The Supreme Court granted certiori in Carpenter.9 5 In its decision,
however, the Court merely stated: "The Court is evenly divided with
respect to the convictions under the securities laws and for that reason
affirms the judgment below on those counts."' 9 6 Thus, the Supreme
Court, presented with the perfect opportunity to evaluate the merits
of the misappropriation theory, failed to address this very important
issue.
In United States v. Chestman,197 the Second Circuit, en banc, re-
turned to the misappropriation theory and, for the first time, reversed
a conviction under the theory. 98 Robert Chestman, a stockbroker,
had a client, Keith Loeb, who wished to consolidate his holdings of
Waldbaum, Inc. stock with those of his wife Susan.199 Keith Loeb's
wife was the granddaughter of Julia Waldbaum (a Waldbaum board
member and mother of Waldbaum's president and controlling share-
holder, Ira Waldbaum). 200 To facilitate trades in Waldbaum stock,
Keith Loeb sent his wife's birth certificate to Chestman, which listed
Shirley Waldbaum Witkin as Susan's mother.
In November 1986, Ira Waldbaum agreed to sell a controlling inter-
est in the company to a competitor at a price of $50 per share.20' Ira
spoke of the impending buyout announcement to, among others, Shir-
ley Witkin, who in turn told Susan Loeb.2 °2 Susan Loeb told her hus-
band of the pending buyout and warned him, as she had been warned
by her mother, not to relay the information to anyone because "it
could possibly ruin the sale. '2°3 On the following day, Keith Loeb
phoned Chestman, informed him of the impending sale of Waldbaum
at "a 'substantially higher' price than its market value," and asked
Chestman what he should do.2014 Chestman refused to advise Loeb,
but proceeded to purchase for himself, over 10,000 shares of
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1034.
195. Carpenter v. United States, 479 U.S. 1016 (1986).
196. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987).
197. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
198. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571.
199. Id. at 555.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. Chestman, however, "denied having spoken to Loeb about Waldbaum
stock on the day of the trades." Id.
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Waldbaum stock that morning for under $26.00 per share.2°5 Loeb
later phoned Chestman again and placed an order to buy 1000 shares
of Waldbaum stock.2 6 At the close of trading for that same day, the
tender offer was announced publicly, causing the stock price to rise to
$49.00 per share on the following day.? 7 The government, after an
SEC investigation, indicted Chestman for violations of Rule 14e-3(a),
Rule 10b-5, mail fraud, and perjury.?' 8 He was found guilty after a
jury trial and he subsequently appealed. 2 9 A Second Circuit panel
reversed Chestman's convictions,2 0 and the court granted an en banc
hearing.211
The Second Circuit affirmed Chestman's Rule 14e-3(a) and perjury
convictions, but reversed his Rule 10b-5 and mail fraud convictions. 212
In examining the Rule 10b-5 violation, the court had to determine
whether the misappropriation theory, "and its predicate requirement
of a fiduciary breach," could be applied to the context of familial rela-
tionships. 213 The court first traced the history of traditional Rule 10b-
5 liability and concluded that such liability attaches when one " 'fails
to disclose material information prior to the consummation of a trans-
action... when he is under a duty to do so.' "214 The court then
considered the misappropriation theory, which requires only an act of
fraud upon the source of the nonpublic information.21 5 The court re-
ferred to this concept as the "fraud-on-the-source" theory of liabil-
ity216 and cautioned that such theory could extend Rule 10b-5 liability
to the "'whole corporate universe.' "217
In an attempt to limit the potential liability under the fraud-on-the-
source theory, the Second Circuit looked closely at what constitutes a
fiduciary or similar relationship. First, the court noted that a fiduciary
duty cannot be imposed unilaterally, and that marriage, without more,
205. Id
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id at 556.
209. Id.
210. United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990).
211. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
212. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 554.
213. Id. at 564.
214. Id. at 565 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)).
215. Id. at 566. The court noted that it had previously applied the theory only in
the employment context, while district courts in the Second Circuit had applied the
theory to other relationships, including a psychiatristlpatient relationship and a father/
son relationship. Id. (citing United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F2d
477 (2d Cir. 1985)).
216. Id. at 567.
217. Id. (quoting United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1377 (2d Cir. 1978)
(Meskill, J., dissenting) (quoting Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,480 (1977)),
rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980))).
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cannot give rise to a fiduciary relationship.218 Second, the court rec-
ognized that certain relationships are "inherently fiduciary," including
attorney/client, executor/heir, principal/agent, and senior corporate
official/shareholder.219
Because the relationships between Keith and Susan Loeb, and be-
tween Keith Loeb and the Waldbaums, did not constitute any of these
"inherently fiduciary" relationships, the court next considered
whether either of the relationships constituted a "similar relationship
of trust and confidence."" 0 The court first established that this "simi-
lar relationship" must be the functional equivalent of a fiduciary rela-
tionship, which exhibits two principal characteristics-"dependence
and influence." 221
In evaluating the relationships at issue in Chestman, the court deter-
mined that neither constituted a similar relationship of trust and confi-
dence.222 As to the Keith Loeb/Waldbaum family relationship, the
court found that the evidence failed to show "influence or reliance of
any sort," and thus failed to demonstrate a fiduciary relationship.223
The court also found that the relationship between Susan and Keith
Loeb did not reach fiduciary status because Keith did not explicitly or
implicitly accept a duty of confidentiality when Susan conveyed to him
the misappropriated information." 4 Because Keith Loeb had not
committed "a predicate act of fraud," Chestman could not be liable as
a tippee. 25 The court therefore reversed Chestman's conviction
under Rule 10b-5.2 6 In so doing, the court implicitly retreated from
its expansive reading of section 10(b) in Carpenter. The court recog-
nized that the misappropriation theory, if not constrained, could cre-
ate liability upon an infinite class of individuals.227
In United States v. Teicher,22 8 the Second Circuit returned to its ex-
pansive interpretation of section 10(b) addressing whether a causal
connection is necessary to find 10b-5 liability under the misappropria-
218. Id. at 567-68.
219. Id. at 568.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 569.
222. Id. at 570-71.
223. Id. at 570.
224. Id. at 571.
225. Id.
226. Id. Notably, however, five of the justices dissented and argued that the exist-
ence of a familial relationship would in and of itself suffice for liability under the
misappropriation theory. See id. at 579 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
227. Id. at 567 (citing United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1377 (2d Cir. 1978)
(Meskill, J., dissenting) (quoting Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 480 (1977),
rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980))).
228. 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993).
[Vol. 642478
UNITED STATES V. BRYAN
tion theory.229 Victor Teicher, an arbitrageur,1 ° received information
from Michael David, an associate of the law firm of Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, concerning possible acquisitions by cli-
ents of the law firm. 3 In addition, Robert Salsbury, a financial re-
search analyst in the arbitrage department of Drexel Burnham
Lambert, Inc., provided Teicher with a copy of the Drexel "phantom
list," which listed companies potentially subject to mergers or take-
overs by Drexel clients.232 Based on this information, Teicher traded
the stock of various companies and netted profits of over $100,OOO.33
The SEC investigated Teicher's activities and indicted him for con-
spiracy to commit securities fraud, mail fraud, and fraud in connection
with a tender offer.234 A jury convicted Teicher, who subsequently
appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the district court improperly charged
the jury as to the elements of his securities fraud chargep s Specifi-
cally, Teicher contended that the jury instructions erroneously stated
that he could be convicted "based upon the mere possession of fraud-
ulently obtained material nonpublic information without regard to
whether this information was the actual cause of [his] sale or purchase
of securities. ' 2 6
The Second Circuit upheld Teicher's convictions, but ultimately
skirted the issue of whether causation is in fact a necessary element
for liability under the misappropriation theory of Rule 10b-5 liabil-
ity.3 7 The court did, however, express its support of the "knowing
229. Id. at 119.
230. "Arbitrage is a trading strategy used by specialized traders (called arbi-
trageurs) to profit from temporary price differences in between markets or securi-
ties." Pass Trak, supra note 31, at 115. There are three types of arbitrage: market
arbitrage, where arbitrageurs take advantage of differences in a security's price in two
different markets; security arbitrage, where arbitrageurs take advantage of differences
in the prices of equivalent securities; and risk arbitrage, where arbitrageurs take ad-
vantage of potential takeover situations that cause fluctuations in stock prices. See hL
231. Teicher, 987 F.2d at 114-15.
232. Id. For interesting accounts of alleged insider trading by persons connected
with Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., see Fenton Bailey, Fall From Grace: The Untold
Story of Michael Milken (1992) (recounting the events surrounding the prosecution of
Drexel "junk bond king" Michael Milken for securities fraud): Jesse Kornbluth,
Highly Confident: The Crime and Punishment of Michael Milken (1992) (same);
Dennis B. Levine & William Hoffer, Inside Out: A True Story of Greed, Scandal, and
Redemption (1991) (describing in an autobiography the insider trading activities of
Dennis Levine, a former Drexel managing director).
233. Teicher, 987 F.2d at 115-17. Teicher bought and sold stock in Avondale Mills,
Allegheny International, American Brands, Revco, Republic Airlines, Westchester
Financial Services Corporation, and Warnaco, Inc. See id.
234. Id. at 118.
235. Id
236. Id. at 119.
237. Id. at 121. The court found that "it [was] unnecessary to determine whether
proof of securities fraud requires a causal connection, because any alleged defect in
the instruction was harmless beyond doubt." I&a
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possession" standard advanced by the government, 38 suggesting that
numerous factors led to this conclusion. First, the court held that the
"in connection with" requirement of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
should be construed broadly, a view which supports the "knowing pos-
session" standard.z39 Second, the court stated that the "knowing pos-
session" standard is consistent with the tenet that "a tippee aquire[s]
the same duty as his fiduciary tipper."2 4 ' The court noted that be-
cause an insider must disclose nonpublic material information or ab-
stain from trading if in "knowing possession" of material nonpublic
information, the same duty should apply to the tippee.241 Third, the
court noted that the standard is "simple" because it recognizes that
one who possesses inside information has an "informational advan-
tage over other traders." '242 Finally, the court suggested that public
policy supports the "knowing possession" standard because it allows
effective enforcement of the securities laws.243
In its most recent encounter with the misappropriation theory in
United States v. Libera, 44 the Second Circuit addressed the issue of
whether a tipper must know that his breach of duty will lead to a tip-
pee's trading on the misappropriated information in order for Rule
10b-5 liability to attach.245 Diana Dillon was an employee of R.R.
Donnelley & Sons Co., the printer of Business Week magazine. 6
Contrary to Donnelley's policy, but after official publication of the
magazine, Diana would bring home copies of Business Week to her
husband William.247 After tracking the stocks of companies discussed
in the magazine's "Inside Wall Street" column and realizing the poten-
tial for making money from trading in these stocks, William Dillon
sought out William Cobb and eventually William Sady, both Donnel-
ley employees, and convinced them to bring him copies of "Inside
Wall Street" on Thursday mornings, prior to Business Week's official
238. Id. at 120-21. "[T]he government advances the view, which has been consist-
ently endorsed by the SEC, that a violation of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 occurs when a
trade is conducted in 'knowing possession' of material nonpublic information ob-
tained in breach of a fiduciary or similar duty." Id. at 120 (citing Sterling Drug Inc.
Investigation, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,570 at 80,298
(Apr. 18, 1978)). An insider trader satisfies the "knowing possession" standard, ac-
cording to the SEC, if when the insider sells his securities, he is in possession of mate-
rial nonpublic information such that he is taking advantage of his position. See id.
(quoting Sterling Drug, 81,570 at 80,298).
239. Id. (citing United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[T]he 'in
connection with' clause must be 'construed ... flexibly to include deceptive practices
"touching" the sale of securities' "), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983))).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id at 121.
244. 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 467 (1993).
245. Id. at 597.
246. Id at 597-98.
247. Id at 598.
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publication.24s Dillon subsequently approached Brad Libera and told
him of his money-making scheme. After informing Libera that Don-
nelley employees were forbidden to remove copies of the magazine
from the plant, Dillon enlisted Libera in helping him to obtain copies
of the column.249 From 1986 to 1987, Libera executed sixty-four
"Thursday trades" on the basis of the "Inside Wall Street" column,
earning him a total profit of $95,000. 250 Francis Sablone, an attorney,
frequently learned of Libera's inside information from either Libera
or their mutual stockbroker.25 Sablone also traded regularly in the
stock of companies mentioned in the column, earning a total profit of
$36,000.152 Libera and Sablone were each indicted for, and subse-
quently convicted on, inter alia, numerous counts of securities fraud
under section 10(b). 53
In reviewing these convictions, the Second Circuit determined that
knowledge by the tipper of a tippee's intent to trade on the misappro-
priated information was not a necessary element for section 10(b) lia-
bility.2 4 Citing United States v. Chestman, the court stated that the
misappropriation theory consists of two elements: "(i) a breach by the
tipper of a duty owed to the owner of the nonpublic information; and
(ii) the tippee's knowledge that the tipper had breached the duty."'5-5
The court noted that the imposition of a requirement of knowledge by
the tipper of the tippee's intent to trade would result in the creation of
a loophole in the law, given the difficulty of proving such knowledge
"to a jury's satisfaction.' '25 6 Finally, the court concluded that sufficient
evidence established that: (i) the misappropriated information was
material and nonpublic; (ii) the employees of Donnelley had breached
a fiduciary duty to their employer; and (iii) Libera and Sablone knew
that the Donnelley employees had breached such fiduciary duty.5
The court thus affirmed Libera's and Sablone's convictionsI Ss
3. The Ninth Circuit and the Misappropriation Theory
The Ninth Circuit was the next circuit to address the misappropria-
tion theory. In SEC v. Clark,259 the defendant, John Clark, was presi-
dent of a company that produced and sold medical supplies.?'6 Clark
248. Id.
249. Id. at 598-99.
250. Id. at 599.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 597.
254. Id. at 600.
255. Id. (citing United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 570 (2d Cir. 1991) (en
bane), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992)).
256. Id. at 600.
257. Id. at 600-02.
258. Id. at 602.
259. 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
260. Id. at 441.
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was also a member of the company's acquisition team, which the com-
pany had established "to keep an eye out for appetizing takeover
targets."'261 Through a fellow member of the acquisition team, Clark
learned that the company was planning to purchase Affiliated Health
Products for approximately thirty-five dollars per share. 62 Upon
learning this information, Clark bought 3000 shares of stock in Affili-
ated Health, an act he attempted to conceal from his employer.263
Subsequent to a public announcement of the acquisition, Clark sold
his shares and netted almost $50,000 in profit.2 64 Clark was indicted
for, and later convicted by a jury on, Rule 10b-5 violations based on
the misappropriation theory.265
The Ninth Circuit, in an attempt to discern whether the misappro-
priation theory is encompassed under Rule 10b-5 and authorized
under section 10(b), first traced the development of the caselaw inter-
preting section 10(b).266 The court noted that two theories of Rule
10b-5 liability had evolved.267 First, "the classical theory" provides
that
"a person violates Rule 10b-5 by buying or selling securities on the
basis of material nonpublic information if (1) he owes a fiduciary or
similar duty to the other party to the transaction; (2) he is an insider
of the corporation in whose shares he trades, and thus owes a fiduci-
ary duty to the corporation's shareholders; or (3) he is a tippee who
received his information from an insider of the corporation and
knows, or should know, that the insider breached a fiduciary duty in
disclosing the information to him. ' 268
Second, the misappropriation theory imposes liability on one who "(1)
misappropriates material nonpublic information (2) by breaching a
duty arising out of a relationship of trust and confidence and (3) uses
that information in a securities transaction, (4) regardless of whether
he owed any duties to the shareholders of the traded stock. '269 The
court then traced the development of the misappropriation theory in
the Second Circuit and concluded that the "thought that has gone into
the misappropriation theory is considerable, and the consistency with
which it has been applied is impressive. '270 Nonetheless, the Ninth
Circuit examined the legislative and administrative underpinnings of
the theory.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See id. at 441-42.
264. Id at 442.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 443-48.
267. See id. at 443-44.
268. Id. at 443 (quoting Barbara B. Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of
Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 Hofstra L. Rev. 101, 101-02(1984)).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 448.
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The court first acknowledged that Rule 10b-5 is a "catchall" provi-
sion.27' The court then examined whether the misappropriation the-
ory falls within the "fraud" concept of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
and determined that it does so "comfortably." Next, the court con-
sidered the "in connection with" requirement of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 and concluded that denying a connection between a mis-
appropriation and any subsequent trading would be "disingenu-
ous."'273 Finally, the court looked to the legislative history of section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, as well as subsequent legislative history, and
concluded that the history provides "strong evidence that the misap-
propriation theory is compatible with the broad language of th[e] pro-
visions."'274 The court thus endorsed the misappropriation theory.
Because Clark's actions fell clearly within the ambit of the theory, the
court upheld his conviction.27
4. The Misappropriation Theory in the Seventh Circuit
In SEC v. Cherif,276 the Seventh Circuit became the third circuit
court to grapple with the misappropriation theory. In what the court
described as a "simple, cunning scheme," Danny Cherif, an ex-em-
271. Id.
272. Id. at 449. In so doing, the court looked at interpretations of mail fraud and
wire fraud statutes for guidance and found that the misappropriation of information
amounts to fraud under these statutes. Id. at 448-49. Finding no reason not to apply
the expansive meaning of fraud found in the mail and wire statutes in the securities
context, the court decided that the mere misappropriation of material inside informa-
tion could be considered "fraudulent" as required under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5. Id. at 449.
273. Id. Here the court framed the question as "whether there is some nexus be-
tween Clark's misappropriation of [the company's] confidential information and any
securities transactions." Id. The court stated that because Clark's sole purpose in ob-
taining the nonpublic information was to profit by trading on such information, it had
"little trouble" concluding that Clark's actions were "in connection with" the
purchase or sale of securities. Id.
274. Id. at 453. Although the court began by admitting that the legislative history
of section 10(b) is "'bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress' explicit intent,'"
id. at 450 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976)), it con-
cluded that the history evinces a broad purpose of protecting the public. See id. The
court also traced the background of Rule 10b-5's adoption. In examining Milton
Freeman's description of Rule 10b-5's passage, the court admitted that it would be
"disingenuous" to posit that the SEC could have "sanctioned or even fores[een] the
use of the misappropriation theory," id. at 451 (citing Remarks of Milton Freeman,
Conference on the Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 793, 922(1967)), but concluded that the SEC was empowered to draft a rule which addressed
"unforeseen species of fraud." Id. Finally, the court inquired into the subsequent leg-
islative history of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by examining the legislative history of
the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264, and the
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L No. 100-704,
102 Stat. 4677, and concluded that Congress expressed a clear belief that the misap-
propriation theory was consistent with section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. SEC v. Clark,
915 F.2d 439, 452-53 (9th Cir. 1990).
275. Clark, 915 F.2d at 449, 454.
276. 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992).
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ployee of First National Bank of Chicago, used his identification card
to gain access to the bank's building on nights and weekends for over
a year after his termination.277 Cherif thus had access to information
from the department of the bank that provided financing for tender
offers and leveraged buyouts.2 78 On the basis of this information,
Cherif traded in the stock of four companies through two brokerage
accounts, and realized profits of almost $250,000.279 The SEC investi-
gated Cherif, and with the help of a coworker, learned of Cherif's
trading activities.280 The district court, upon application by the SEC,
issued a temporary restraining order and an injunction against Cherif,
who subsequently appealed. 2 1
The Seventh Circuit adopted the misappropriation theory, after
tracing its development, and stated:
We join [the Second and Ninth Circuits] in holding that a person
violates Rule 10b-5 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 by misappropriating and trading upon material informa-
tion entrusted to him by virtue of a fiduciary relationship such as
employment. There is a common sense notion of fraud behind the
misappropriation theory.... We agree that buying or selling securi-
ties "in connection with" fraud perpetrated on an employer to ob-
tain material non-public information constitutes a violation of Rule
10b-5. 2
The court then turned to Cherif's argument that he in particular
lacked the fiduciary duty necessary for liability under the misappropri-
ation theory because he owed no duty to his former employer when
he misappropriated the information.283 The Seventh Circuit rejected
this argument, stating that a common law duty "obligates an employee
to protect any confidential information entrusted to him by his em-
ployer during his employment.""1  The court found that Cherif
breached a continuing duty to his former employer when he used his
identification card, in addition to information gained as an employee,
information about upcoming transactions. 8  Theto misappropriate i to2aot i t sct  h
court therefore held that Cherif's conduct was fraudulent in violation
of Rule 10b-5.2 86
277. ld at 406.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 406-07.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 407.
282. I& at 410.
283. lad at 411.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 412. The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its commitment to the misappropri-
ation theory in SEC v. Maio, adopting the rationale applied in the Cherif case. See
SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 630-638 (7th Cir. 1995).
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II. Ti- BRYAN CASE
In United States v. Bryan,' the Fourth Circuit addressed for the
first time the validity of the misappropriation theory. The court re-
fused to adopt the theory despite previous acceptance by other circuit
courts, reasoning that the theory fails to comport with the text of sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. m This part examines the facts of Bryan, as
well as the analysis used by the Fourth Circuit in reaching its decision.
A. Facts of the Case
The Governor of West Virginia appointed Elton Bryan as the direc-
tor of the West Virginia Lottery in April 1990.1s9 Bryan's duties in-
cluded negotiating and securing contracts on behalf of the lottery.290
In the summer of 1991, the lottery began to investigate the possibility
of expanding its video lottery gaming.291 At a meeting in July 1991,
high level officials in the Governor's administration (including Bryan)
decided to proceed with the expansion of video lottery, but also de-
cided to wait until after the anticipated reelection of the Governor in
November 1992.2 - After several video lottery manufacturing compa-
nies learned of the July 1991 meeting, they began to lobby for a por-
tion of the anticipated business.2 93 One of these companies, Video
Lottery Consultants ("VLC"), ultimately gained favor with the Gov-
ernor and his administration 94 In exchange for locating a manufac-
turing plant within the state, VLC would receive an exclusive contract
to provide video lottery gaming terminals.2 9 Bryan undertook to en-
sure that the Lottery Commission would in fact award such a contract
to VLC.
2 9 6
From August 1992 until November 1992, a number of meetings took
place between VLC, Bryan, and the Deputy Director of the Lottery to
negotiate the terms of the contract.297 In September 1992, Bryan
purchased 300 shares of VLC stock.298 In November 1992, the Gover-
nor was reelected. Soon thereafter the Lottery Commission voted in
favor of expanding the state's video lottery program and ordered the
establishment of an investigative committee to determine the best
method for the state to proceed with the program.299 Bryan then re-
287. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
288. Id. at 944.
289. 1d. at 937.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 938.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id
296. Id.
297. Id. at 938-39.
298. Id. at 939.
299. Id.
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quested, without the Lottery Commission's knowledge, the issuance
of a Request for Proposals which he had drafted previously in antici-
pation of this chain of events. ° In response to the Request, VLC and
International Game Technology, a rival of VLC, submitted pack-
ages.3 0 1 Despite the formation of an evaluation committee, Bryan en-
sured that the committee would rate the VLC bid most favorably.3 0 2
Bryan was subsequently indicted and charged with wire fraud and
mail fraud violations, securities fraud in violation of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 under the misappropriation theory, and perjury for falsely
testifying before a grand jury.30 3 A federal jury convicted Bryan on all
counts and he appealed these convictions to the Fourth Circuit.? n
B. The Fourth Circuit's Opinion
In a unanimous decision, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Bryan's mail
fraud, wire fraud, and perjury convictions, but reversed his section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 convictions.05 In reversing the securities fraud
convictions, the Fourth Circuit determined that "neither the language
of section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court authority interpreting
these provisions, nor the purposes of these securities fraud prohibi-
tions, will support convictions resting on the particular theory of
misappropriation."3"6
The Bryan court first looked to the text of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 and determined that the language of both "sweeps broadly. 3 7
The court also noted that "[a]bsent guidance from the Supreme Court,
the language of the Rule, if not of the statute, could plausibly accom-
modate the misappropriation theory. ' 30 8 Nonetheless, the Bryan
court suggested that Supreme Court cases decided in the past two de-
cades warn against expanding the concept of fraud in securities "be-
yond what the words of the [Exchange] Act reasonably will bear. 30 9
With this admonition in mind, the court then evaluated the misappro-
priation theory.310
The court began its evaluation with the concept that manipulation
and deception are the touchstones of liability under section 10(b).31'
300. Id.
301. id.
302. Id.
303. See id. at 936.
304. 1&
305. See id
306. Id. at 944.
307. Id. at 945.
308. Id.
309. Id. (citing Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1446 (1994);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)).
310. Id.
311. Id. (" 'The language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to pro-
hibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception.'" (quoting Santa Fe In-
dus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977))).
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The court determined that "manipulation" is virtually a term of art in
the securities context which specifically refers to "'practices, such as
wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices'" intended to affect mar-
ket activity artificially by misleading investors.31 2 The court thus lim-
ited the scope of its analysis to a determination of whether the
misappropriation theory falls under the Rule 10b-5 prohibition against
"fraud." The court also noted that "fraud" can encompass no more
than the section 10(b) prohibition of "deception. 31 3 The court then
defined "deception" as a "material misrepresentation or omission. '314
The Fourth Circuit next turned to another tenet of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of section 10(b): "[T]hat the principal concern
of section 10(b) is the protection of purchasers and sellers of securi-
ties. '315 Citing Chiarella v. United States316 and Dirks v. SEC,3 17 the
Bryan court concluded that a duty to disclose or abstain from trading
arises only from an affirmative duty to disclose which in turn arises
only out of a relationship of trust between parties to a transaction, and
not merely because of a party's possession of nonpublic informa-
tion.318 In fact, "where the Court has not expressly limited the scope
of the statute to frauds upon purchasers or sellers, it has, for the most
part, described the statute as reaching no further than to frauds upon
investors.1319 Finally, the Bryan court suggested that the only persons
other than purchasers or sellers who may come within the purview of
section 10(b) are those "closely linked to securities transactions."3' 0
Such persons include potential share purchasers, current shareholders
who choose not to buy or sell based on material misrepresentations or
omissions, and creditors, shareholders, or those who have a relation-
ship with the issuer who suffer a loss in investment value because of
insider activities.32'
On the basis of the Supreme Court's interpretations of section 10(b)
in Chiarella and Dirks, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the misap-
propriation theory was invalid. In reaching this conclusion, the court
stated:
312. Id. at 945-96 (quoting Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 476).
313. Id. at 946.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 946-47.
316. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
317. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
318. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 947 (4th Cir. 1995). The Bryan court also
read the Blue Chip decision as supporting its "purchasers and sellers" premise. Id. at
948. "As the [Blue Chip] Court explained in reaching its holding, the language of
section 10(b) would 'surely [be] badly strained [if] construed to provide a cause of
action, not to purchasers and sellers of securities, but to the world at large.'" Id.
(citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 n.5 (1975)).
319. Id. at 948 (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,663 n.23 (1983); Central Bank v.
First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1446 (1994); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 476-77 (1977)).
320. Id.
321. Id. (citing Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 737-38).
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In light of the Court's consistent interpretation of section 10(b) as
proscribing only the deception, by material misrepresentation or
omission, of a purchaser or seller of securities, or of a person in
some way connected with or having a stake in an actual or proposed
purchase or sale of securities, we believe that the misappropriation
theory cannot be defended.32
The court reasoned that while the misappropriation of information
may involve "deception" in a generalized sense, it will not in most
cases constitute a "misrepresentation" or "nondisclosure. ' 323 Further-
more, the Fourth Circuit reasoned, the misappropriation theory cre-
ates liability upon "the mere breach of a fiduciary relationship or
similar relationship of trust and confidence. ' 324 Thus, the theory is
not consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Santa Fe Industries
v. Green, which requires deception in addition to a breach of fiduci-
ary duty for liability under section 10(b). 326
The Fourth Circuit went on to note that even if deception were not
a requirement for liability under the misappropriation theory, the the-
ory would still fail to meet the "in connection with a purchase or sale
of securities" requirement of section 10(b).3 27 According to the court,
"the theory effectively eliminates the requirement that a person in
some way connected to a securities transaction be deceived, allowing
conviction not only where the 'defrauded' person has no connection
with a securities transaction, but where no investor or market partici-
pant has been deceived. '328 The court stated:
In allowing the statute's unitary requirement to be satisfied by any
fiduciary breach (whether or not it entails deceit) that is followed by
a securities transaction (whether or not the breach is of a duty owed
to a purchaser or seller of securities, or to another market partici-
pant), the misappropriation theory transforms section 10(b) from a
rule intended to govern and protect relations among market partici-
pants who are owed duties under the securities laws into a federal
common law governing and protecting any and all trust relation-
ships. If, as the Supreme Court has held, the fraud-on-the-market
theory is insupportable because section 10(b) does not ensure equal
information to all investors .... a fortiori such a general fraud-on-
the-source theory in pursuit of the same parity of information can-
not be defended.329
322. Id. at 949.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
326. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 949 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Santa Fe Indus.,
430 U.S. at 473-74).
327. Id. (footnote omitted).
328. Id. at 950.
329. Id. (citation omitted).
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Thus, the court concluded that the misappropriation theory fails to
meet the "in connection with" requirement of section 10(b). 3 °
Although the Bryan court found that the text of section 10(b) pro-
vides a sufficient basis to reject the misappropriation theory, the court
went further in its analysis and stated that "the principles that inform
interpretation of the securities fraud provisions also counsel rejection
of the theory."'331 The court emphasized that the Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated that the certainty and predictability of the securities
market is served by clearly defined rules.332 The court reasoned that
absent this predictability, investors will find themselves "pawns" in an
SEC litigation strategy of which they have no knowledge.333 The
court noted that application of the misappropriation theory brings un-
certainty into the securities market because it requires only the breach
of any fiduciary duty.3 1 Fiduciary duties, the Fourth Circuit stated,
are often difficult to ascertain, and no court since the inception of the
misappropriation theory has offered a principled basis for determining
which fiduciary relationships give rise to Rule 10b-5 liability. 3
The court next reasoned that the rejection of the misappropriation
theory would not have a "notable impact" on efforts to combat fraud
in the securities markets.3 36 First, the Fourth Circuit pointed to the
fact that much of the conduct covered under the misappropriation
theory is criminalized under section 10(b) as interpreted in Dirks and
Chiarella.337 After the Dirks decision, traditional insiders, temporary
insiders (such as underwriters, accountants, and lawyers), and tippees
of either group are subject to a duty to disclose nonpublic information
or abstain from trading.338 Second, the court reasoned that persons
who are not liable under section 10(b) after Dirks will most likely be
subject to liability under mail and wire fraud statutes.339 The court
referred to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Carpen-
ter,34 which split equally over the defendant's securities conviction
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 950-51.
333. Id. at 951.
334. Id
335 Id. The Bryan court stated: "[T]he only guidance that the Second Circuit has
been able to provide, apart from its observation that the misappropriation theory
rests on general notions of 'dependency and influence,' is that it will not apply outer
permutations of chancery relief in addressing' whether a fiduciary duty or similar rela-
tionship of trust and confidence has been breached." Id. (citations omitted) (citing
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569, 570 (2d Cir. 1991)). In examining the
case law addressing the misappropriation theory, the Bryan court concluded that if
one attempted to formulate an applicable rule relating to fiduciary duty, the scope of
such rule would be extremely broad. Id.
336. Id. at 953.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346).
340. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
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under section 10(b), but unanimously affirmed his conviction for vio-
lations of the wire fraud statute."' Third, the Bryan court noted that
conduct not covered under section 10(b) or the mail and wire fraud
statutes "will in many instances give rise to criminal and civil liability
under the array of state laws addressing fraud and unethical
conduct." 2
Finally, the Fourth Circuit traced the evolution of the misappropria-
tion theory in the Second Circuit and commented that the "somewhat
harrowing" development appeared as "almost a testament to the the-
ory's invalidity. '343 The Bryan court looked at the United States v.
Newman,344 Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc.,345 and SEC v. Materia 1 6
holdings and noted the apparent inconsistency in the Second Circuit's
endorsement of the theory.'" 7 The court then examined the Second
Circuit's decision in United States v. Chestman348 and found that the
Chestman court could not "square the misappropriation theory with
the Supreme Court's holdings in Santa Fe Industries, Chiarella, and
Dirks, and [the Chestman court,] not surprisingly, realized that the
misappropriation theory was neither necessary, defensible under pre-
cedent, susceptible in principle to limitation, nor justifiable on the
strength of the broad purposes of the [Exchange] Act."349 The Court
also noted that even the Chestman dissenters, who advocated the
adoption of the "misappropriation theory, were unable to identify a
credible legal basis for the theory."350
The Bryan court ultimately concluded:
[I]n securities law, as in all areas of the law, our perceptions of what
is wise or fair are ultimately of no relevance. In the end, we, as
judges, no less than anyone else, are bound by the actual prohibi-
tions enacted by Congress. It is adherence to this fundamental limi-
tation on our own authority that leads us to conclude that, as
ignoble as Bryan's conduct was, it simply was not conduct that is
341. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 953 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Carpenter, 484
U.S. at 24, 28).
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
345. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
346. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984).
347. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 953-57 (4th Cir. 1995). Specifically, the
court recognized that despite the fact that the Second Circuit adopted the misappro-
priation theory in Newman, it subsequently rejected the theory in Moss, only to resur-
rect the theory again in Materia. Id.
348. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
349. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 958.
350. Id. at 959. The court addressed Judge Winter's dissent in Chestman, stating
that Winter "admitted that 'any obvious relationship [between the misappropriation
theory and] Section 10(b) is presently missing.'" Id. (alteration in original) (citing
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 578 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992)).
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prohibited by section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.351
In light of all these considerations, the Fourth Circuit rejected the mis-
appropriation theory.
EII. THE HARVARD COMMENT
In its December 1995 issue, the Harvard Law Review published a
Case Comment in response to the Fourth Circuit's Bryan opinion?
The Harvard Comment argues that "the [Bryan] court ultimately
erred in concluding that the text of [section 10(b)] and the applicable
Supreme Court precedent could not support the [misappropriation]
theory. ' 3 3 Despite its ardent disapproval of the Bryan decision, the
Harvard Comment's ultimate conclusion is merely that while no court
"must give effect to the misappropriation theory," courts should do
SO.3
54
The Harvard Comment first attacks the Bryan decision by stating
that contrary to the Bryan court's interpretation, the misappropriation
of material information does in fact meet the "misrepresentation or
nondisclosure" requirement enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Santa Fe Industries v. Green.355 Underlying the misappropriation the-
ory is the rationale that a person who misappropriates information
from another party does so by breaching a fiduciary duty arising out
of a relationship of trust and confidence between the parties.3  The
Harvard Comment describes the relationship as follows:
[B]y entering into a fiduciary relationship, a person "implicitly
stat[es] that she will not divulge or use to her own advantage infor-
mation entrusted to her in the utmost confidence" and therefore she
"deceives the other party by playing the role of the trustworthy em-
ployee or agent" and "defrauds it by actually using the stolen infor-
mation to its detriment.
' '3 57
The Harvard Comment argues that the misappropriation of nonpublic
information meets the misrepresentation requirement by violating a
continuing 'tacit' representation of confidentiality. Alternatively, the
misappropriation of material inside information satisfies the nondis-
closure requirement because such action constitutes a breach of the
duty to an employer not to trade on the basis of confidential informa-
tion without consent.358
351. Id.
352. Recent Case, supra note 13.
353. Id. at 536.
354. Id. at 541.
355. Id. at 537-39 (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977)).
356. id. at 539 (citing SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 447-48 (9th Cir. 1990)).
357. Id. (quoting Clark, 915 F.2d at 448) (alteration in original).
358. Id.
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The Harvard Comment also contends that the Bryan court was in-
correct in its finding that the misappropriation theory is at odds with
the Supreme Court's suggestion in Santa Fe Industries that" '[n]ot "all
breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction"
... come within the ambit of Rule 10b-5.' "I" The Harvard Comment
retorts that the breach of a duty accompanied by appropriate factual
disclosure "even if in connection with the buying or selling of securi-
ties" would not be actionable under the misappropriation theory.3 60
Moreover, the Harvard Comment urges that the Fourth Circuit was
mistaken in its conclusion that the misappropriation theory is inconsis-
tent with prior Supreme Court precedent interpreting the "in connec-
tion with" requirement of Rule 10b-5. 361 According to the Harvard
Comment, applicable Supreme Court decisions have not limited Rule
10b-5 actions only to fraud committed against sellers or buyers of se-
curities and others closely related to such buyers and sellers.362 The
Harvard Comment acknowledges that the Court's decision in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 63 might suggest the contrary posi-
tion, but reminds the reader that "the Court also unmistakingly em-
phasized the fact that the entire Rule 10b-5 private cause of action
was solely a judicial creation, and that the decision to limit its range
was thus largely a matter of judicially determined policy. '' 3 4 The
Harvard Comment reasons that Blue Chip thus does not foreclose the
use of the misappropriation theory as a predicate for potential crimi-
nal liability or liability in an SEC enforcement action.3 65
The Harvard Comment next posits that "[a] strong argument may
be made that the misappropriation theory ... serve[s] broad public
interest functions," and thus should fall within the ambit of section
10(b).3 66 While it recognized that previous Supreme Court decisions
suggest that the protection of purchasers and sellers of securities is the
principal concern of section 10(b), the Harvard Comment notes that
the Court has never held this concern out as the sole purpose of the
statute.367 The Harvard Comment argues that, in fact, the Court
could not reach this conclusion because the explicit language of the
359. Id. (quoting United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 946 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983) (citing Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 472))).
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 539-40.
363. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
364. Recent Case, supra note 13, at 540 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)). The Harvard Comment finds that it was "quite
odd" for the Bryan court to have even relied upon Blue Chip to determine the mean-
ing of section 10(b), because the Blue Chip Court made it clear that the text of the
statute was not the basis for its decision. Id. at 540 n.28 (citing Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at
737).
365. Id. at 540.
366. Id. at 541.
367. Id.
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statute forbids such a finding. 6s Moreover, the Harvard Comment
posits that Supreme Court precedent has recognized a broad purpose
underlying section 10(b).369 The Harvard Comment argues that the
misappropriation theory falls within this broad purpose because the
theory helps "assure would-be investors of the fairness of the market
or [protects] property rights in information."370
Based on these findings, the Harvard Comment concludes that the
Bryan decision may further the development of insider trading juris-
prudence by pushing the Supreme Court to decide the merits of the
misappropriation theory. If the Court does address the theory, how-
ever, the Harvard Comment urges, "[c]ontrary to Bryan's claims,
neither the statute nor previous decisions [would bind] the Court's
hands. 371
IV. THE INDEFENSIBILITY OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
Should the Supreme Court accept the challenge, the Court must,
contrary to the Harvard Comment's assertions, conclude that United
States v. Bryan372 was correct in finding that the misappropriation the-
ory is invalid. The theory fails on several grounds. First, the text of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not support liability based on the
misappropriation theory. Second, the legislative history of the Ex-
change Act does not evince a congressional intent in favor of the the-
ory. Third, use of the misappropriation theory contravenes Supreme
Court precedent. Fourth, application of the misappropriation theory
has been inconsistent and unpredictable. Finally, sufficient alterna-
tives exist to capture the illegal behavior encompassed by the misap-
propriation theory. This part examines these various considerations in
turn.
A. The Misappropriation Theory Cannot Find Support within the
Text of Section 10(b)
The textual controversy surrounding the misappropriation theory
essentially asks two questions. First, does the misappropriation of
nonpublic information constitute a "manipulative or deceptive de-
vice" under section 10(b)? 373 Second, does the misappropriation the-
ory comport with the "in connection with" requirement of section
368. Id
369. See id at 541 n.32 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203
(1976)).
370. Id at 541.
371. Id
372. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
373. Section 10(b) states that it shall be illegal "[t]o use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of security .... " 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
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10(b)? 374 The Bryan court answered both questions in the negative.
The Harvard Comment, however, argues that the misappropriation
theory meets both of these requirements. This section examines the
two questions in depth.
1. The Misappropriation Theory Does Not Require a
"Manipulative or Deceptive" Act
Regulation of fraudulent behavior is the driving force behind sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 375 This fraudulent behavior may take the
form of manipulation or deception.376 The Supreme Court has
deemed manipulation to be "a term of art, '377 and "deception" to
mean "a material misrepresentation or the material failure to dis-
close" information in violation of a duty to disclose. 78
These definitions make clear that activities covered under the mis-
appropriation theory are not of the type Congress intended to pro-
hibit with the enactment of section 10(b). Manipulation refers to
practices which artificially affect market activity.3 79 Misappropriation
of material nonpublic information and trading on such information
involve no attempt to affect market activity artificially. A misap-
propriator is not attempting to create the appearance of market activ-
ity, but instead is seeking to profit personally by trading upon the
misappropriated information. Further, the Bryan court determined
that misappropriation does not constitute deception as defined by the
Supreme Court.380 The court concluded that "the misappropriation
theory does not even require deception, but rather allows the imposi-
374. Section 10(b) forbids the use or employment of "any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion may prescribe .... " Id. (emphasis added).
375. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) ("Section 10(b) was
designed as a catchall clause to prevent fraudulent practices."); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that a private cause of action under
section 10(b) will not lie absent an "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud"); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 (1975) ("The wording of § 10(b)
[is] directed at fraud.. . ." (emphasis added)).
376. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1446 (1994) ("In
§ 10(b), Congress prohibited manipulative or deceptive acts in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities."); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983) (stating that
manipulation or deception is a requirement of Rule 10b-5); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977) ("Thus the claim of fraud and fiduciary breach in this
complaint states a cause of action under any part of Rule 10b-5 only if the conduct
alleged can be fairly viewed as 'manipulative or deceptive' within the meaning of the
statute."); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971) ("[W]e read § 10(b) to mean that Congress meant to bar deceptive devices and
contrivances in the purchase or sale of securities . .. ").
377. See Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 476 (" 'Manipulation' is 'virtually a term of art
when used in connection with securities markets.'" (quoting Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S.
at 199)).
378. Id. at 474.
379. See id. at 476.
380. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 949 (4th Cir. 1995).
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tion of liability upon the mere breach of a fiduciary relationship or
similar relationship of trust and confidence."3'8
The Harvard Comment argues that the misappropriation of non-
public information qualifies as both a misrepresentation and a nondis-
closure, and thus constitutes deception in violation of section 10(b).
The Harvard Comment, however, misses the mark. The misappropri-
ation theory fails to meet either the misrepresentation or the nondis-
closure standard for deception.
"Misrepresentation" was characterized by the Supreme Court in
Santa Fe Industries as a "misstatement."' 3s The misappropriation the-
ory requires no such behavior.3s A person is guilty of misappropria-
tion when he "(1) misappropriates material non-public information
(2) by breaching a duty arising out of a relationship of trust and confi-
dence and (3) uses that information in a securities transaction, (4) re-
gardless of whether he owed any duties to shareholders of the traded
stock.' '384 Such violation, by definition, does not involve any affirma-
tive "misstatement" on the part of the misappropriator, either to the
person to whom he has breached a duty or to the person with whom
he has traded. Thus, the Harvard Comment's suggestion that one may
meet the misrepresentation requirement by violating a "continuing
'tacit' representation of confidentiality"'' 5 renders the requirement
meaningless. This analysis might demonstrate the existence of a fidu-
ciary duty between the misappropriator and the source of the infor-
mation, but does nothing to prove that any affirmative "misstatement"
by the misappropriator has taken place.
In the absence of a misstatement, liability must rest on the defend-
ant's failure to disclose the nonpublic information. The Supreme
Court squarely addressed the nondisclosure standard in Chiarella v.
United States.3 6 As the Court stated:
[S]ilence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may
operate as a fraud actionable under § 10(b) despite the absence of
statutory language or legislative history specifically addressing the
legality of nondisclosure. But such liability is premised upon a duty
to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence be-
tween parties to a transaction.38
The misappropriation theory is not consistent with this definition of
nondisclosure because the theory does not require the breach of a
381. Id
382. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977).
383. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 949.
384. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990).
385. Recent Case, supra note 13, at 539.
386. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
387. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (emphasis added); see also
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-55 (1983) (recognizing Chiarella as establishing a
"requirement of a specific relationship between the shareholders and the individual
trading on inside information").
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duty existing between the parties to the transaction at issue. The sug-
gestion that the misappropriator violates the nondisclosure require-
ment by breaching a duty owed to the source of the information
rather than to his trading partner stands in direct conflict with the
definition of nondisclosure set out in Chiarella.
Several circuit courts have held that the misappropriation theory
comports with the "manipulative and deceptive" requirement of sec-
tion 10(b), but these courts have provided little explanation for their
findings. In United States v. Newman,388 the first Second Circuit case
to adopt the misappropriation theory, the court completely ignored
the language of section 10(b) and instead looked to the language of
Rule 10b-5 to determine that the requirement is not manipulation and
deception, but rather "fraud and deceit. '389 The Newman court then
stated that it "need spend little time on the issue [of fraud and deceit]"
because the defendants had "defrauded [their] employers as surely as
if they took their money. 390
The Newman court's "fraud and deceit" standard was subsequently
followed in other decisions. In SEC v. Materia,39' the Second Circuit
merely echoed Newman and stated that against the backdrop of the
expansive meaning of "fraud or deceit," Materia's actions clearly
qualified as fraudulent.39 Moreover, in United States v. Carpenter,393
the Second Circuit explained that the defendant had acted with the
requisite "fraud and deceit" because his actions did not "significantly
differ from the 'fraud and deceit' in Newman and Materia.''3 94
The Ninth and Seventh Circuits also have ignored Supreme Court
precedent in their analysis of the section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 fraud
requirement. The Ninth Circuit looked to mail and wire fraud cases
for guidance as to what constitutes "fraud." '395 The Seventh Circuit in
SEC v. Cherif396 stated that the defendant's "actions were fraudulent
in the common understanding of the word because they deprived
some person of something of value by 'trick, deceit, chicane or
overreaching.' ",39
The circuit court cases, while relying upon common understandings
of fraud, fail to examine the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
"manipulative and deceptive" requirement. The Court has specifically
388. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
389. Id. at 17.
390. Id.
391. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984).
392. Id. at 201.
393. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
394. Id. at 1031.
395. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 448-49 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Carpenter, 484 U.S.
at 27).
396. 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992).
397. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 412 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992).
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defined such terms, but the Second, Ninth, and Seventh Circuit cases
make no attempt to square the misappropriation theory with the
Court's definitions. The circuit court cases, therefore, have not ade-
quately justified the misappropriation theory under the "manipulative
and deceptive" requirement of section 10(b).
2. The Misappropriation Theory Is Inconsistent with the "In
Connection With" Requirement
Even assuming that the misappropriation of material inside infor-
mation constitutes deceptive behavior, the misappropriation theory
must comply with another statutory requirement to be valid under
section 10(b); the "manipulative or deceptive" act must take place "in
connection with" the purchase or sale of securities. 39 The Bryan
court concluded that the "in connection with" requirement of section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 indicates that the statute and rule reach "only
deception of persons with some connection to, or some interest or
stake in, an actual or proposed purchase or sale of securities.' ' 3 9 The
court concluded that the mere misappropriation of material nonpublic
information does not satisfy this standard because the "'defrauded'
person has no connection with a securities transaction. 400
The Harvard Comment disagrees with this reasoning and argued
that Supreme Court decisions have not left section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 applicable only to fraud committed against purchasers and sell-
ers of securities and persons closely related to such purchasers and
sellers." The Harvard Comment down plays the Court's holding in
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Store , which limited standing in
10(b) actions to purchasers and sellers of securities,40 3 stating that the
Court in that case ruled in the private action context and thus the
Court's decision did not foreclose application of the misappropriation
theory in a criminal or SEC enforcement proceeding.404 Additionally,
the Harvard Comment argues that because section 10(b) empowers
398. Section 10(b) states that "It shall be unlawful for any person ... (b) To use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a na-
tional securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or de-
ceptive device." 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994). Rule 10b-5 imposes similar liability for
engaging in practices "which operate[ ] or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1995).
399. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 950 (4th Cir. 1995). The Bryan court had
established earlier that the "principal concern of section 10(b) is the protection of
purchasers and sellers of securities," and thus a duty to disclose under section 10(b)
can exist only when there is a duty between the two parties to the transaction. Id at
946-47.
400. Id at 950.
401. Recent Case, supra note 13, at 540.
402. 421 U.S. 423 (1975).
403. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
404. Recent Case, supra note 13, at 540.
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the SEC to regulate practices " 'in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors,'" courts should not read the "in connection with"
requirement constrictively.40
5
Again, however, the Harvard Comment misses the mark. The mis-
appropriation of material nonpublic information, without more, does
not come within the Court's construction of the requirement that the
challenged conduct take place "in connection with" the purchase or
sale of a security under section 10(b). In addition to Blue Chip, other
cases demonstrate that the Court requires a duty between the parties
to the securities transaction at issue, or between parties closely related
the primary parties, in order to satisfy the "in connection with" lan-
guage of the statute.40 6 The misappropriation theory widens section
10(b)'s scope considerably by looking to relationships outside the se-
curities transaction at issue. The misappropriation theory imposes lia-
bility based on the breach of a duty owed to the source of the
information, not to the other party to the securities transaction. °7
Moreover, the person from whom the information was appropriated
is generally not closely related to the counterparty to the transaction.
For example, as in Cherif, an individual who is a former employee of a
bank can misappropriate information from the bank and trade on the
basis of such information. °8 In such a case, the misappropriator deals
fairly, or at least not fraudulently, with the other party to the transac-
tion, while the bank has no relation whatsoever with the misap-
propriator's trading partner. As the Bryan court stated, the
misappropriation theory "artificially divides into two discrete require-
ments-a fiduciary breach and a purchase or sale of securities-the
single indivisible requirement of deception upon the purchaser or
seller of securities.14 9 Because the misappropriation theory ignores
the "in connection with" requirement of section 10(b), the theory can-
not serve as a basis for liability under the statute.
The circuit court cases that endorse the misappropriation theory
have been less than thorough in their analyses of the "in connection
with" requirement of section 10(b). The Second Circuit in Newman
espoused a broad "touch test" requirement for section 10(b) liability
and stated that because Newman's "sole purpose in participating in
405. Id. at 541 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)) (emphasis omitted).
406. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1446 (1994) (reaf-
firming that § 10(b) is not violated for nondisclosure absent an "independent duty of
disclosure"); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 (1983) (recognizing a "requirement of a
specific relationship between the shareholders and the individual trading on inside
information"); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (stating that "si-
lence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud
actionable under § 10(b) ... [if it] is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a
relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction").
407. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
409. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 950 (1995) (emphasis in original).
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the misappropriation of confidential takeover information was to
purchase shares of the target companies, we find little merit in his
disavowal of a connection between the fraud and the purchase. ' 410 In
Materia, the Second Circuit again summarily dismissed "[w]hatever
limitations [were previously] ... read into the 'in connection with'
language," stating that "it is clear that the requirement is satisfied by
the self-evident nexus presented in this case."4 ' The Second Circuit
in Carpenter found that the misappropriation theory is consistent with
the "in connection with" requirement because the misappropriator's
use of material inside information for financial gain, to the detriment
of the investors with whom the misappropriator trades, supports such
a conclusion.412 The Ninth Circuit in SEC v. Clark,4 13 echoing New-
man, described the "in connection with" standard as requiring the
fraud to "touch" upon the securities transactions at issue, and stated
that "[t]o deny a connection between the misappropriation and the
subsequent trading would be disingenuous." 4 4 The Seventh Circuit in
Cherif found that the nexus between the defendant's trading activities
and his misappropriation satisfied the "in connection with" require-
ment because "[h]is trades were 'in connection with' a fraudulent
scheme to gain access to material, non-public information.1415
Again, the circuit court cases ignore Supreme Court precedent con-
cerning the "in connection with" requirement under section 10(b) and
instead rely upon common sense notions including "nexus" and
"touch." The Court has explicitly established that the "in connection
with" language focuses on the parties to the transaction.41 6 The Sec-
ond, Ninth, and Seventh Circuits cases look beyond the trading parties
and thus are unconvincing in their contention that the misappropria-
tion theory meets the section 10(b) "in connection with" requirement.
B. The Misappropriation Theory Does Not Comport with the
Legislative History of Section 10(b)
While Congress indisputably intended the Securities and Exchange
Acts to eradicate insider trading, section 10(b) was not the provision
originally intended to combat such abuses. 1 7 Instead, Congress en-
acted section 16(b) to address insider trading liability.418 Further-
more, the legislative history of the Exchange Act demonstrates that
Congress intended section 10(b) to control manipulative practices,
410. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981).
411. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984).
412. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1032 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S.
19 (1987).
413. 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
414. Id. at 449.
415. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 411 (7th Cir. 1991).
416. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
417. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
418. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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which do not include the mere misappropriation of nonpublic infor-
mation in the absence of a duty to disclose such information. 19
Congress enacted the Securities and Exchange Acts in part to com-
bat the "unfair methods of speculation employed by large operators
and those possessing inside information regarding corporate af-
fairs."4"0 Congress drafted section 16(b) to prevent the unfair use of
information obtained by corporate insiders due to their relationships
with issuers.4"' The misappropriation theory imposes liability on per-
sons other than corporate insiders.42 Thus, the theory extends well
beyond the category of insider trading that Congress sought to pro-
hibit under the Exchange Act.
Because section 16(b) did not succeed in preventing the misuse of
nonpublic information by corporate insiders, courts began to use sec-
tion 10(b) to address insider trading.42 Whatever the validity of the
section's application to traditional insiders, the employment of section
10(b) to reach beyond the variety of insider trading that Congress in-
tended to combat with the Exchange Act is inappropriate. 424 The mis-
appropriation theory uses section 10(b) to impose liability on a class
of persons that Congress did not seek to "catch" with its enactment of
the Exchange Act. Moreover, Congress originally intended section
10(b) to combat the use of manipulation, deception, or contriv-
ances.4 "5 The Senate Report accompanying the Exchange Act defined
such practices to include wash sales, matched orders, and other trans-
actions specifically designed to manipulate the price of a security.42 6
The misappropriation theory does not itself attempt the regulation of
these practices. Thus, the theory is untenable in light of the legislative
intent underlying the Exchange Act.
C. The Misappropriation Theory Controverts Supreme Court
Precedent
The Harvard Comment argues that, should the Supreme Court have
an opportunity to pass on the merits of the misappropriation theory,
the Court will not be bound by its prior decisions in addressing the
419. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
420. S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
421. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
422. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 406 (7th Cir. 1991) (ex-bank employee), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir. 1984) (finan-
cial printer); Chiarella v. United States, 588 F.2d 1358, 1362 (2d Cir. 1978) (printer),
rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
423. See supra note 24.
424. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1453-54 (1994)
("Policy considerations cannot override our interpretation of the text and structure of
the Act, except to the extent that they may help to show that adherence to the text
and structure would lead to a result 'so bizarre' that Congress could not have in-
tended it.").
425. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
426. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934).
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validity of the theory.4 27 The Bryan court conversely found that
Supreme Court precedent concerning liability under section 10(b)
would not support the misappropriation theory.'2 The Supreme
Court, as the Fourth Circuit noted in Bryan, has formulated certain
basic principles for interpreting section 10(b) and has established stan-
dards for insider trading liability under this provision.4 29
The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that section 10(b) cannot
be read more broadly than the text of the statute will allow.43 Addi-
tionally, the Court has held that Rule 10b-5 cannot be read more
broadly than section 10(b). 431 As noted earlier, the plain language of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 does not support the misappropriation
theory.432 Thus, the imposition of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liabil-
ity based on the misappropriation theory contravenes Supreme Court
precedent.433
Further, the Court in Chiarella and Dirks v. SEC434 specifically con-
fronted the issue of insider trading liability under section 10(b).43 5 In
both cases the Court insisted that section 10(b) liability requires a
duty to disclose on the part of the individual trading with knowledge
of material inside information.436 In Chiarella, where the actions of
the defendant closely resembled what would normally create liability
under the misappropriation theory,43 7 the Court refused to affirm
427. See Recent Case, supra note 13, at 541 (stating that "[c]ontrary to Bryan's
claims, neither the statute nor previous decisions have bound the Court's hands,"
should the Court "pass upon the merit of the misappropriation theory").
428. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995).
429. See id. at 945.
430. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1448 (1994) ("It is
inconsistent with settled methodology in § 10(b) cases to extend liability beyond the
scope of conduct prohibited by the statutory text."); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 234 (1980) ("As we have emphasized before, the 1934 Act cannot be read
'more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit.' " (inter-
nal quotations and citations omitted)). But see Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life
& Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) ("Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not tech-
nically and restrictively.").
431. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (stating that the
Commission's authority cannot extend the scope of the power granted to it by Con-
gress under section 10(b)).
432. See supra part IV.A.
433. See id.
434. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
435. See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (reversing section 10(b) con-
viction of "tippee" for lack of duty to disclose or abstain from trading); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (reversing section 10(b) conviction of printer for
lack of duty to disclose or abstain from trading).
436. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654-55; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
437. Compare Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224-25 (finding that Chiarella could not be
charged with section 10(b) violations for trading on information regarding the names
of potential target companies obtained while working for a printing company) with
United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 597-99, 602 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding violations of
section 10(b) for individuals who traded based upon information obtained from news-
paper article prior to its publication), cerL denied, 114 S. Ct. 467 (1993).
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Chiarella's conviction because he was not subject to an affirmative
duty to disclose the nonpublic information in his possession. 38 The
Court stated: "When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclo-
sure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak. We hold that a
duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession
of nonpublic market information." '439 The Court reaffirmed that a
duty to disclose is a prerequisite for liability to attach under section
10(b) in Dirks.44° The Dirks Court held that in order for a tippee to
be found liable under section 10(b), he must assume a fiduciary duty
to the shareholders, which can arise only through a corporate insider's
breach of his own fiduciary duty to the shareholders. 44 1
The misappropriation theory fails to comply with the Court's re-
quirement of a "duty to disclose" for section 10(b) liability. The mis-
appropriation theory extends well beyond the violation of a direct
duty to disclose, as the Court noted in Chiarella. For example, as in
Materia, an individual who misappropriates information from a
printer has no relationship with the party with whom he trades.442
Further, the misappropriation theory sweeps more broadly than a tip-
pee's duty to disclose, which the Court addressed in Dirks, because
the theory imposes such secondary liability even where there is no
initial breach of duty by an insider. As the Chiarella Court stated:
"Formulation of... a broad duty, which departs radically from the
established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship be-
tween two parties .... should not be undertaken absent some explicit
evidence of congressional intent." 43 The misappropriation theory is
an example of such a radical departure and is thus invalid.
D. Application of the Misappropriation Theory in the Second
Circuit Has Been Inconsistent and Unpredictable
The Bryan court emphasized that "[i]t would be difficult to over-
state the uncertainty that has been introduced into the already uncer-
tain law governing fraudulent securities transactions through adoption
of the misappropriation theory."4' The court pointed to the Second
Circuit's development of the misappropriation theory and posited that
since the misappropriation theory's inception, no court has been able
to establish a bright-line test distinguishing which breaches of fiduci-
ary duty give rise to liability.4" 5 The Supreme Court in Dirks sug-
438. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233-35.
439. Id. at 235.
440. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654-55.
441. Id. at 660.
442. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
443. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
444. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 951 (4th Cir. 1995).
445. lad The court cited cases that establish liability on bases such as the duties that
exist between an employer and employee, an employee and his tippee, a newspaper
and its reporters, and a husband and wife. Id. (citing United States v. Newman, 664
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gested that "it is essential... to have a guiding principal for those
whose daily activities must be limited and instructed by the SEC's in-
side-trading rules."" 6 In light of the Second Circuit's inability to es-
tablish a bright-line test and consistently apply the misappropriation
theory, subjecting individuals to liability on the basis of a shifting the-
ory would be unfair.
Harmonization of the Second Circuit's decisions in Newman, Moss
v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 7 and Materia is nearly impossible. In New-
man, the Second Circuit adopted the misappropriation theory by rely-
ing upon a "fraud and deceit" standard and by using a "broad 'touch'
test" to meet the "in connection with" requirement."' In Moss, how-
ever, where the same "fraudulent" activities as in Newman were at
issue, the Second Circuit conversely recognized that the misappropria-
tion theory fails to meet the "duty to disclose" requirement as set out
in Chiarella and determined that the misappropriation theory would
grant plaintiffs "a windfall recovery simply to discourage tortious con-
duct by securities purchasers.""49 In Materia, the Second Circuit re-
lied upon the "windfall recovery" concept to justify its return to
acceptance of the misappropriation theory by stating that "such analy-
sis [as that in Moss] bears only on the type of question raised in a
private suit for damages; it is not relevant to an inquiry into whether
the Rule was or was not contravened."4 - This attempt to distinguish
Moss is hollow. The Moss court invalidated the misappropriation the-
ory in reliance upon the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella, an
SEC action, not a private suit for damages.5- Thus, even the Second
Circuit, the birthplace of the misappropriation theory, has been un-
able to adopt a consistent position concerning the validity of the the-
ory. To rely upon these cases to support the misappropriation theory
is to base an argument on shaky ground.
Furthermore, the Second Circuit's holding in United States v.
Chestman452 is difficult to square with the court's earlier decisions. In
Chestman, the Second Circuit apparently retreated from its expansive
endorsement of the misappropriation theory. The court acknowl-
edged that the misappropriation theory cannot be squared with any
previous form of section 10(b) liability. 53 The Chestman court stated
that the misappropriation theory is a "second general theory of Rule
F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir.
1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 564 (2d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992)).
446. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
447. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
448. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17-19 (2d Cir. 1981).
449. Moss, 719 F.2d at 16.
450. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984).
451. Moss, 719 F.2d at 16.
452. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cer. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
453. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566-67 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc),
cerL denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
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10b-5 liability" which "does not require that the buyer or seller of
securities be defrauded. ' 454 Further, the court recognized that it
broke ranks with the traditional theory of insider trading liability in
Carpenter, where "the defendants did not owe the people with whom
they traded a duty to disclose or abstain from trading-absent resur-
rection of the twice rejected parity of information theory. '455
The Second Circuit in Chestman also acknowledged that the misap-
propriation theory could lead to unbridled liability under section
10(b).45 6 The court stated that while fiduciary/shareholder obligations
"arise within a narrow, principled sphere," other fiduciary obligations
under common law are "anything but clear. '457 Moreover, the court
also acknowledged that its own precedents provide little guidance
concerning breaches of fiduciary obligations outside of the employer/
employee context.458 Thus, the court concluded that it should "tread
cautiously" in extending Rule 10b-5 liability," fearing that its decisions
could "lose method and predictability. ' 459 The Chestman opinion
thereby stands in stark contrast with the Second Circuit's other broad-
based misappropriation theory decisions.
E. Sufficient Alternatives Ensure Liability for Misappropriators
The Bryan court noted that a rejection of the misappropriation the-
ory would not significantly hinder efforts to combat securities fraud.
First, the court reasoned that much of the criminal behavior that the
misappropriation theory tries to combat falls within the Supreme
Court's holdings in Chiarella and Dirks.46° Chiarella, and more specif-
ically Dirks, create liability for persons who would also be covered
under the misappropriation theory. As the Bryan court stated: "Af-
ter Dirks, corporate insiders .... and so-called temporary insiders,
such as underwriters, accountants, lawyers, or consultants working for
a corporation, are under a duty to disclose or abstain, as are tippees of
either group. ' 461 Further, in Chestman, the Second Circuit acknowl-
edged that the defendants in Newman and Materia would fall under
the temporary insider liability established in Dirks.462
The Bryan court also suggested that persons not included under the
Chiarella and Dirks umbrella of liability would be subject to sanctions
under federal statutes prohibiting mail and wire fraud.463 The Court
454. Id. at 566.
455. Id. at 567.
456. See id.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 953 (4th Cir. 1995).
461. ld (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983)).
462. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 1004 (1992).
463. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 953.
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in Carpenter created an expansive definition of "fraud" under the wire
and mail fraud statutes that imposes liability in many instances where
the behavior would not fall under the Chiarella or Dirks standards.I
The Court defined fraud broadly to include activities that fall within
the" 'common understanding' " of the word," 'usually signify[ing] the
deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or over-
reaching.' "I This definition readily encompasses the type of behav-
ior engaged in by misappropriators.
Finally, the Bryan court posited that many of the breaches covered
by the misappropriation theory also give rise to liability under state
laws concerning fraud and unethical conduct.4" California, as well as
other states, provide penalties for a person "whose relationship to the
issuer gives him access, directly or indirectly, to material information
about the issuer not generally available," and who purchases or sells a
security knowing that such information "would significantly affect the
market price of the security[,] ... is not generally available to the
public, and.., is not intended to be so available, unless he has reason
to believe that the person selling to or buying from him is also in pos-
session of the information."467 In addition, in New York, a jurisidic-
tion in which a large number of cases addressing the misappropriation
theory are litigated, the General Business Law establishes liability for
any person who engages in "[a]ny fraud, deception, concealment, sup-
pression, false pretense or fictitious or pretend purchase or sale." 6s
The New York General Business Law also creates liability for any per-
son who possesses material non-public information "relating to any
takeover bid" obtained from an insider or "any other person acting on
behalf of the offeror or target company" and who purchases, sells, or
causes to be purchased or sold any security of such target company.4 9
Thus, while proponents of the misappropriation theory argue that
use of the theory is necessary to combat insider trading, ample means
464. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24, 28 (1987) (affirming unani-
mously Carpenter's convictions for federal mail and wire fraud, while affirming Car-
penter's section 10(b) convictions by an equally divided court); Bryan, 58 F.3d at 943-
44 (finding sufficient proof to support Bryan's wire fraud conviction for trading on
confidential information, but rejecting liability under the misappropriation theory).
465. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27 (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358
(1987) (quoting Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924))).
466. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 953.
467. Cal. Corp. Code § 25402 (West 1977). Four other states have identical or simi-
lar statutory provisions. See Iowa Code Ann. § 502.402 (West 1991); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 58-13B-32 (Michie 1991); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, § 1-406 (1994); S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. § 47-31A-101(b) (1991).
468. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352-c(1)(a) (McKinney 1984). A New York court has
interpreted such provision to encompass behavior similar to that which would estab-
lish liability under the misappropriation theory. See People v. Florentino, 116 Misc. 2d
692 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1982) ("There is no requirement under... § 352-c of the New
York General Business Law that the victims of defendant's breach of confidence be
sellers or buyers of securities.").
469. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 1609(b) (McKinney 1984).
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exist to ensure that those who have been injured by insider trading
can seek redress in court. The misappropriator may have committed
the type of behavior prohibited by Chiarella and Dirks. The misap-
propriator may be guilty of violations of federal mail or wire fraud as
defined by the Court in Carpenter. Finally, the misappropriator may
be liable under state law antifraud provisions.
CONCLUSION
In United States v. Bryan, the Fourth Circuit became the first circuit
court to reject the misappropriation theory. The Fourth Circuit in re-
jecting the misappropriation theory did so in contravention of the
adoption of the theory by three sister circuits, thereby creating uncer-
tainty in federal securities law. The Supreme Court, not yet having
addressed the validity of the theory, should, when presented with the
opportunity to do so, restore consistency to this area of law. The
Harvard Comment implicitly suggests that when the Court addresses
the issue, it should endorse the misappropriation theory. This Com-
ment, however, posits that the misappropriation theory is
indefensible.
The misappropriation theory is invalid for a host of reasons. First,
misappropriation does not constitute a "manipulative or deceptive"
act as required by section 10(b). Second, the misappropriation theory
fails to meet the "in connection with' requirement of section 10(b).
These two grounds alone should be enough to invalidate the misap-
propriation theory, but other considerations also point to rejection of
the misappropriation theory. The legislative history of section 10(b)
does not support the application of the theory. In addition, the appli-
cation of the misappropriation theory contravenes Supreme Court
precedent. Finally, numerous alternative ways are available to punish
misappropriators besides establishing liability under section 10(b).
Given all these considerations, the Supreme Court should resolve the
confusion created in the circuit courts by unambiguously rejecting
misappropriation liability under section 10(b).
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